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Introduction
As the business environment changes and grows, so do the opportunities to
commit fraud. Businesses employ thousands of people, which make it impossible to
monitor each individual. The internet provides new avenues of theft and fraud that have
never before been considered. "The more an employer relies on outside companies to
provide the goods and services it needs to run its business, the greater chance it runs of
having to address fraud-related problems." (Pelland, p.l) These factors make it necessary
to develop a new type of accountant, the forensic accountant. Government agencies like
the FBI and IRS now have entire divisions devoted to this one issue. Employing
hundreds of accountants to detect and prevent fraud.
The purpose of this paper is to identify how devastating fraud can be to a
company. If not correctly handled, fraud can put a tremendous burden or even
completely destroy the victim company. That is why it is important to be able to identify
causes that lead to fraud, and how to control the situation if someone commits fraud
against the company. This paper will cover the following issues: fraud services, types of
fraud, fraud statistics, warning signs, the auditors role to detect fraud, what to do when a
fraud is detected, the forensic accountants role, and how to deter fraud. After all this has
been discussed, a case involving fraud and the Cendant Corporation will be presented and
discussed.
Accounting Services Related to Fraud
Like those government agencies, several public accounting firms such as KPMG,
Arthur Andersen, and Deloitte & Touche have identified the need for a full-time forensic
I
2accounting staff. KPMG in particular has their Forensic & Litigation Services,
comprised of several individuals with various degrees and backgrounds. KPMG's
"Forensic Services conducts traditional and cyber investigations to prevent, detect,
quantify, correct, and monitor wrongdoing, whether by someone acting on behalf of the
company or his/her own individual benefit. They help organizations to: prevent fraud by
conducting fraud risk vulnerability assessments; avert potential lawsuits or regulatory
actions; recover lost revenue; and maintain or restore their business reputation and
integrity." (KPMG, p.l) KPMG's forensic product components include:
1. Investigative and Integrity Management Services
a. Intemallnvestigations
- investigating charges of fraud, waste,
mismanagement, or misconduct.
b. Monitoring Services
- providing assistance with government
regulations compliance, contract compliance, and court orders.
c. Investigative Due Diligence
- organizations considering new
business relationships need to perform in-depth background
checks on the company in question and its key personnel.
d. Revenue Recovery
- assists in the recovery of assets and the
proceeds from contracts, joint ventures, and franchise
arrangements.
e. Integrity Management
- design and help implement
comprehensive corporate ethics and compliance programs to
establish appropriate standards for corporate and employee
behavior and facilitate the prevention and detection of law
violations.
2. Health Care Fraud & Compliance
- work proactively with
health care providers
- including hospitals, physician groups,
pharmaceutical companies, managed care organizations, and
nursing homes
- to identify fraud, take corrective action, and
implement corporate compliance programs.
3. Cyber and Technology Exploitation Investigations
a. Computer Network Investigations
- work with clients to
determine the extent of the computer network attack, affix
culpability, assess financial and programmatic losses,
recommend corrective action, implement corporate
compliance and defensive programs, and reduce or prevent the
potential of cyber-related civil litigation.
b. Forensic Evidence Recovery Services
- forensic media
analysts and computer forensic professionals help clients
recover legally sufficient electronic evidence in a manner
appropriate for a legal proceeding.
c. Cyber Investigative Due Diligence - identify and evaluate the
potential risks of outsourcing arrangements and perform in-
depth background checks on the service provider to ensure
that it is not employing former "crackers" in systems
administration.
d. Advanced Technology Exploitation and Risk Management
_
identify and evaluate the risks posed by the use of new
technologies and provide advice on how to reduce/prevent
cyber E-commerce fraud and asset loss.
Types of Fraud
Basically, any kind of misuse or theft of money or assets is
considered fraud. KPMG's 1998 fraud survey identifies the most common
forms of fraud as:
1. Front-end fraud is the diversion of revenue before it is
recorded in the accounting system.
2. Breach of trust and conflict of interest often arise from
an employee's attempt to enrich himself or herself at
the company's expense.
3. Secret commissions and kickbacks
4. Theft and embezzlement
These four are the most common but many other types of fraud are
committed. KPMG has identified 14 different forms of fraud. The
following table lists these types and shows the average loss to the
organizations that suffered from these crimes.
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Figure 1: Fraud Types and Average
Loss
Type of Fraud 1998 1994
Medical/Insurance Claims Fraud
Average Loss $3,177,000 $622,000
Number of Organizations 29 16
False Financial Statements
Average Loss $1,239,000 $765,000
Number of Organizations 12 38
Credit Card Fraud
Average Loss $1,126,000 $367,000
Number of Organizations 48 50
Check Fraud (forgery & counterfeiting)
Average Loss $ 624,000 $360,000
Number of Organizations 96 135
Inventory Theft
Average Loss $ 346,000 $305,000
Number of Organizations 43 100
Bid Rigging and/or Price Fixing
Average Loss $ 342,000 $110,000
Number of Organizations 8 12
ATM Theft
Average Loss $ 300,000 $132,000
Number of Organizations 24 19
False Invoices & Phantom Vendors
Average Loss $ 256,000 NA
Number of Organizations 49 NA
Diversion of Sales
Average Loss $ 180,000 $206,000
Number of Organizations 6 41
Expense Account Abuse
Average Loss $ 141,000 $ 21,000
Number of Organizations 44 99
Unnecessary Purchases
Average Loss $ 63,000 $ 14,000
Number of Organizations 40 56
Conflict of Interest
Average Loss $ 38,000 $162,000
Number of Organizations 10 37
Kickbacks
Average Loss $ 35,000 $231,000
Number of Organizations 19 35
Payroll Fraud
Average Loss $ 26,000 $ 35,000
Number of Organizations 9 45
4
5As the table shows, the amount of loss has doubled and in some
cases tripled over the four-year period from 1994 to 1998. Payroll fraud
and kickbacks are the only two types that have decreased in this time
frame. This means that it has either become more difficult to commit
these frauds, or the criminals are executing them more carefully. The
table also indicates that the number of organizations falling victim has
drastically decreased in all but two frauds (medical/insurance fraud and
ATM theft). By putting these two factors together, we see that the trend is
moving towards fewer frauds committed at higher losses.
Fraud Statistics
According to KPMG's 1998 Fraud Survey, "seventy-seven percent
of the 5,000 businesses surveyed were exposed to fraud during the
pervious year." "Fraud and financial malpractice costs the U.S. economy
$400 billion a year. That translates into 6% of revenue or $9 per day, per
employee." (Zeune, p.1) The common misconception is that fraud is only
committed by the low class, underpaid subordinates of a company.
However, in a study of "400 CEOs, controllers, and graduate business
students; 47% of the CEOs, 41% of the controllers, and 76% of the
graduate students were willing to commit fraud to get a promotion and pay
raise. The same study found that 14% of the CEOs, and 9% of the
controllers were willing to inflate revenues to get ajob." (Zeune, p. 1)
6When it comes to detecting these frauds, the most common source
is from the company's own employees. KPMG's 1998 Fraud Survey
"noted that employee whistle-blowers accounted for 58 percent of all
fraud detection. The second and third most common ways that companies
learn about fraud is through internal controls (51 percent) and internal
auditor review (43 percent). There isn't that much difference between




When a fraud occurs, a company can only blame itself for not
seeing the signs. There are not steps a company can take to become
completely fraud-proof. The best course of action for a company is to
keep an eye on its employees, and watch for indications that an employee
is committing or might be influenced to commit fraud. Two factors must
be monitored, the individual and the environment.
Generally, three things have to be present before fraud occurs:
Need, opportunity, and rationalization. This is known as the 'triangle of
fraud.'
I. Need takes two fOnTIS
- direct and indirect. Directneed is stealingto fund
cash needs such as an addiction
- drugs, alcohol,and gambling. Indirect
need, on the other hand, is usually keeping the company afloat. This results
in cooking the books to make sure the loan is obtained and buy time to fix
the problem later.
2. Opportunity is defined as a perception that there is a low probability of
being detected. Most frauds are done out of desperation when the borrower
can't see any other way out. These frauds usually involve accelerating
revenues or delaying expenses.
3. Rationalization is the borrowers' mental process of making the action fit
within their personal code of conduct. In other words, the borrowers must
be able to 'talk themselves into the action.' (Zeune, p. 2)
Whether the individual is committing the fraud for personal reasons or for
the good of the company, the "triangle of fraud" is the key to identifying
and stopping an individual from making the mistake.
The individual is not the only aspect that affects whether or not a
fraud occurs. In many cases, a person who would never think of
committing fraud is caught in a business environment where they reason
that the only correct course of action is to intentionally misrepresent
performance. There are four conditions that make a company vulnerable
to financial fraud.
I. Pressures faced by senior management, operations or financial reporting
areas. Pressures may come from various outside sources, the most common
being the fear of not hitting analysts' quarterly earnings forecasts. Short-
term performance has become the 'be all and end all' when it comes to
judging corporate performance. Internal pressures generally take the form
of an expectation of hitting some budgeted revenue or expense level. 'Tone
at the top.' The link between accounting irregularities and environment has
been documented by the National Commission on Fraudulent Reporting.
When upper management sets overly aggressive targets for revenue growth,
operating expense cuts, etc., personnel are often pressed hard to meet those
targets. Couple this with an attitude at the top that falling short of a goal is
unforgivable, and personnel may feel squeezed between being honest and
losing their jobs, or 'playing with the numbers' so they can tell management
what they want to hear.
2. Legitimate room for judgment in accounting practices. Generally accepted
accounting principals (GAAP) leave a lot of legitimate leeway for estimates
and alternative ways of treating particular transactions. Under pressure,
personnel may blur the lines between exercising judgement and managing
earnmgs.
3. System failures. In many organizations it is appallingly simple to keep bad
news under wraps until it has reached the point where a crisis looms. This
is particularly true when outside auditors focus more on data than on
corporate systems; internal audit is ineffective, misdirected due to lack of
independence or poor attitude, or nonexistent; and the audit committee
doesn't take the initiative to act as a watchdog over these two areas.
(Young, pp.I-2)
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8As indicated by the individual and environmental pressures, the majority
of frauds are committed because of burdens brought on by the company.
Therefore, companies can decrease their risk of fraud by relaxing their
expectations. This however will not deter the individual who is in it
strictly for his/her own needs. That is why a company must always keep
an eye on itself and its employees.
Auditors Role to Detect Fraud
When a fraud occurs, the company either blames the accountant or
expects him/her to find the person responsible. Unfortunately, it is the
former instead of the latter. Andrew Blatt, a mortgage fraud specialist
solicitor, says that "to have any kind of major fraud you need to have a
crooked solicitor and a crooked accountant. You need someone to cook
the books and someone to bend the rules." In order for a fraud to continue
over a long period of time and for a large amount of money, the fraud
must be committed by or with the help of an accountant. The missing
money or assets must be 'buried' in accounts in such a way that they are
not brought to the attention of other accountants reviewing the entries. An
exceptional item is the first thing that will alert an accountant to the
possibility of a fraud. Therefore, only a clever accountant can fool another
accountant.
Many companies put the responsibility of deterring or detecting the
fraud on their internal auditors/accountants. However, internal
accountants must work with a handicap. It is seldom in their ability to
implement internal controls adequate enough to prevent a clever fraud.
When a fraud slips past the internal auditors, the company next turns the
responsibility to the external auditors. Again these individuals are
working with a handicap. They do not have the ability to properly
interrogate employees or to follow the paper trail back to its source. It is
often too late to detect the fraud when it becomes the responsibility of the
auditor. "In practice, only 2% of frauds are discovered by auditors."
(MacErlean, p. 44)
Sometimes an audit is so large that short cuts are taken in order for
the accountants to perform at the monetary level deemed acceptable by the
company. In some cases, auditors have developed as standard practice a
number of habits that put banks at risk. The following are several things
auditors do that can be prohibited contractually in the loan agreement:
I. Positive affirmative duty. Paragraph I of SAS (Statement of Accounting
Standards) 82 states that it is a positive affirmative duty of auditors to plan
and perform the audit to obtain a reasonable assurance of detecting material
fraud. Yet auditors consistently reject the notion that they have a
responsibility to detect material fraud.
2. 'Must,' not 'should.' SAS 82 uses fuzzy language. For example, paragraph
12 states, 'The auditor should specifically assess the risk of material
misstatement...' The problem is that 'should' is an ambiguous word and
does not belong in an auditing standard. 'Should' indicates a suggestion,
recommendation, or optional activity. Auditors do not understand that
'should' means the procedure must be performed.
3. Audit the business. SAS 82 demands that accountants audit the business,




4. Auditors do not understand the client's business. By their very nature,
financial statements are lagging indicators. Auditors will always have a
difficult time detecting fraud unless they learn to audit' leading indicators'
of performance. Examples of 'leading indicators' of performance include:
·
Fast food restaurants measure how long customers stand in line
before getting their food.
·
Delivery companies, such as UPS or FedEx, monitor the
percentage of packages delivered on time.
·
Call centers monitor the time customers are on hold before being
connected to a CSR (customer service representative), the time it
takes to monitor the call, and the percentage of time the problem is
solved.
5. Compliance with SAS 82. Ifthe 1997 audit program and work papers look
just like 1996, which look like 1995, the auditor did not comply with SAS
82. Auditors cannot comply with a major new standard and do the same
thing they have always done.
6. False sign-off. False sign-off occurs when staff sign-off on audit work that
they do not perform because of the pressure to perform the audit on less
budget time each year.
7. Stop asking the client. Asking the borrower how to perform audit steps
renders the auditor not independent and puts the lender at risk of
undiscovered fraud.
8. Trust the client. Auditors trust clients because they pay the audit fee. This
is a big mistake.
9. Consistency. If the auditor's consistency derives from doing the same thing
every year, it renders the auditor not independent. SAS 82 demands that
auditors do something differently each year to keep the client off balance.
10. Surprise procedures. Auditors who tell the client what work they are going
to perform are not independent.
11. PBe. Audit work papers should never be PBC prepared by client. Auditors
cannot be independent when they let the borrower do their work for them.
Auditors are good at auditing what is there. Auditors are not good at
auditing what is not there but should be. (Zeune, pp. 3-4)
By requiring the above-mentioned steps, auditors are more likely to find
frauds that would otherwise go undiscovered. However, companies do not
want to pay the fees to allow an auditor the time to properly perform these
steps. Budgets tend to decrease over time as firms continue to compete for
clients. This is a vicious cycle that companies must stop if they want and
expect auditors to discover fraud.
What to do When the Fraud is Detected
At this point in time, it is essential for the company to be cautious
and do what is in its best interests. It might be felt that a large legal
pursuit might tarnish the company's reputation and cause them to lose
even more money than that lost in the fraud. There are some steps that
must be done regardless of the course of action the company decides to
take. Once the fraud has been found or suspected, KPMG has identified
several steps the victim must take to insure termination and proper
prosecution of the fraud. The steps are:
I. Secure all assets.
2. Collect all evidence and prevent anyone from tampering with it.
3. Contact insurer. Claim could be refused if this is not done.
4. Consult a legal advisor before confronting the suspected employee.
5. Figure out what type of remedy will be sought.
6. Weigh the pros and cons of prosecution.
7. If an external fraud, terminate all contacts.
8. Allocate resources to handle investigation, seek help if needed.
If the above measures are taken, the victim can insure proper handling of
the situation. An organization must remember the possible ramifications
of prosecution, and how it could affect their image. Provided that the
committed fraud is not a federal offense, an organization can handle the
occurrence however they deem fit.
A discovered fraud can turn the company into a chaotic frenzy that
if not controlled, can cause more damage than the fraud itself. "The initial
48- to 72 hour period following the discovery of a possible fraud is critical
in terms of damage control. Steps taken during this crucial time can set
11
the tone for all subsequent events and mean the difference between a
disaster that breaks the company and a controlled crisis that the company
is able to weather." (IMA, p. 1) The most important thing to consider, is
who is going to investigate the fraud? This should be someone the
company is sure is completely independent from the situation. In some
cases this can be financial management, but external auditors are the best
if the management personnel are even slightly suspected.
An important issue is that the company must not jump to
conclusions. Every aspect must be scrutinized to give the investigative
team certainty that this is truly a fraud and not a judgement error. Many
accounting procedures can be done several ways that give very different
results. If the suspected fraud is only an error, then it must be corrected
along with any past statements if needed. Personnel should be approached
in a calm, rational manner to verify allegations. If the investigative team
runs around accusing employees who are not responsible, there can be
very serious ramifications. Also, the "whistle-blower" must be properly
identified and questioned. The presented fraud could be nothing more
than one employee acting out a personal vendetta against another
employee or the company as a whole.
Once the fraud has been verified, it is essential the company
prevent any further liability it has to its current or potential shareholders.
"The problem will not go away. The company now knows that the people
in the markets are trading based on false financial information. The
12
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company must disclose the irregularities as soon as feasible, if only to stop
the increase in liability that accrues with each trade of the company's
stock." (IMA, p. 1)
The next action the company must take is to organize a board
meeting. This will be a very tense situation, as board members are in
shock from the recent discovery. The following questions inevitably will
arise at the board meeting, and will probably remain largely unanswered
for some time:
.
How widespread is the fraud and how far back does it go? Probably wider
and further than anyone suspects.
Who did it? Who knew about it? Who did not know but should have?
Often there is no clear paper trail. A key issue is whether the CFO of the
company or division involved in the fraud knew or took part. Another
critical question is whether the CEO
- the person running the board meeting
- or other nonfinancial personnel committed, knew about or condoned the
fraud?
Who to keep and who to fire? It will be hard for the board to know who
should be let go prior to a full investigation. Additionally, it may be
prudent to keep some of the lower-level people
- even if they were involved
- to cooperate in the investigation and assist in restating the financial
statements. (IMA, p. 2)
.
.
Most of these questions arise because of the initial shock. However, the
answers will not help much in the grand picture of dealing with the fraud.
The problem has occurred and there is nothing that can be done to change
that fact. These questions will help to set the framework for how the
investigation will proceed. The board members are going to want to
believe that this occurrence proceeded over a short period of time and was
committed by one person. Unfortunately, chances are that the fraud
existed over a much longer time and was executed by more people than
originally anticipated.
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By the end of the meeting, the board should have decided on the
plan of action for the investigation. An independent individual must be
assigned to each identified task. Deadlines and goals should also be set at
this time. After the meeting, the board must decide how they are going to
proceed with the initial press release. How the fraud is disclosed can have
a detrimental effect on the views of the public. The board must decide
whether they want to make an early disclosure, or wait until a later date to
make more accurate statements. An early disclosure can decrease the
liability brought by shareholders relying on faulty information. However,
inaccurate reporting can shake public confidence in the company and harm
future transactions.
Forensic Accountants Role
If a company decides that they want to pursue a full investigation,
they should hire the services of a forensic accountant. It is imperative that
the company gives the accountant full rights and control of the
investigation. If the accountant is limited in his/her reach, then he/she will
not be able to perform a proper investigation and that will be evident in
his/her findings. The company must be aware that the accountant must
use every means available in the course of the investigation. For example,
an accountant might need to gain entry into a person's office or desk
through the use of a locksmith, in order to search for documents that might
incriminate that individual. Though these actions might seem overly
15
aggressive at times, remember that this individual stole from the company
and they have a legal right to pursue such actions.
A forensic accountant must not be limited to his/her financial
abilities only. "They also need to sharpen their sleuthing skills
- namely,
interrogation
- to get beyond the numbers." (Hansen, p. 43) This is an
ability that is not taught in major universities, nor is it something that
everyone can do easily. It takes a very intelligent individual with
exceptional skills at reading the interviewee. "Good interrogators take
notice of more than the interviewees' verbal responses: They track body
language, noting such clues as eye contact, posture and movement of the
head, hands and feet. Those clues often reveal more than the words
themselves.''''(Hansen, p. 43) Sometimes, the only indication whether the
employee is telling the truth is in those mannerisms identified during the
interviewing process.
The most important thing the accountant must do, is make the
interviewee comfortable. "As long as an interrogator exhibits a
reasonably friendly front, suspects tend to cooperate. It is through that
initial cooperation that a good interrogator can slowly peel back a
suspect's layers oflies and obfuscation or make a reluctant tipster
comfortable with revealing information." (Hansen, p. 43) A suspect or
whistle blower will only open up if they feel comfortable or do not realize
they are giving away incriminating information.
,
,
A good interrogator is not born, nor does one develop the
necessary skills over night. A good way for someone to develop these
skills is through the use of the fraud assessment questioning (FAQ)
technique. This tool was developed to help identify the surface causes of
the fraud. The FAQ will not uncover the entire fraud all at once, but will
help the accountant as to how to proceed next. "F AQ will solicit
responses from interviewees about how someone can steal from the
organization and not get caught; those responses can be used to identify
internal control deficiencies, which then should be investigated to
determine whether someone has already exploited them. Also, responses
to FAQ can help identify high- fraud-risk employees." (Hansen, p. 44)
Every possible deficiency or risk must be investigated, regardless of how
insignificant it might seem at the time. Even though the easiest detection
tool is to ask someone about it, a fraud is not always going to jump out at
the accountant. Therefore, a complete investigation will be needed in
every fraud case.
The first step in the interviewing process is to meet individually
with each employee. As mentioned earlier, the beginning of the interview
is the time to make the employee comfortable. This is done through
simple, relaxing questions such as: what is the employee's job title, how
long he/she has been with the company, and major responsibilities. These
questions do not have to be limited to employment issues, and the person
16
Once rapport has been established between the interviewer and
might become more comfortable talking about their family or personal
interests.
employee, the FAQ can start. "The initial phase of an FAQ interview has
two purposes: to help the employee become comfortable with the
interview environment and to observe the employee's verbal and
nonverbal reactions when responding to questions that are not crime-
related." (Hansen, pp. 44-45) The second part is known as "calibrating"
the interviewee. By asking noncrime-related questions, the interviewer is
able to determine how the employee answers questions where the
employee is most likely telling the truth. These reactions are then
17
compared to the employee's responses to crime-related questions where
the employee might be lying. If there are any differences between
responses, then the interviewer knows to further investigate those areas. It
must also be noted that an employee is not necessarily lying just because
he/she responds to a question in a matter inconsistent with their
"calibration." The employee must be investigated further if he/she
continues to respond inconsistently.
After the employee has been 'calibrated,' the interviewer can move
on to the following fraud assessment questions:
1. I've been engaged to look into the prevention and detection offraud. The
owner wants me to ask about potential misdeeds by management and
employees. Do you understand?
Note that the employee is not being accused of wrongdoing. The
interviewee is simply being asked if he or she understands the purpose of
the interview.
2. When we talk about fraud in business, we're not talking about taking a
company pen or making afew personal copies on the copy machine.
Rather, we're referring to a whole range of activities where people steal
from the company, lie to management or take unfair advantage of the
company. Do you think fraud is a problem for business in general?
The goal of this question is to identifyemployeeswho
- if given theopportunity
- mightdefraud the company. A 'yes' responseindicates
general agreement that fraud is a problem in business today. A 'no'
response can mean the interviewee either doesn't believe fraud is a business
problem or isn't telling the truth.
3. Do you think this company has a problem with fraud?
This question can help uncover fraudulent activity as well as identify high-
fraud-risk employees. A 'yes' response indicates the employee has specific
knowledge of fraud within the company and should be questioned further.
A 'no' response indicates genuine belief or denial of the problem. Since the
pattern of questioning is moving from the general to the specific, the
interviewee may think that eventually he or she will be directly accused of
fraud and may respond in ways that will terminate the interview as soon as
possible.
4. If employees or managers are stealing from this company, why do you
think they would do it?
Honest people tend to think that a fraud perpetrator must be either dishonest
or greedy and will not offer rationalizations that minimize the seriousness of
the problem. Someone engaged in fraudulent activity might minimize the
act with rationalizations such as 'the employee must have been underpaid or
underappreciated' or ' everybody does it.' Such a person's areas of
responsibility should be carefully, but discreetly, reviewed.
5. Frequent, small thefts by employees can add up to a lot of money. If you
knew another employee was stealing from the company, what would you
do?
This question can help determine whether employees are familiar with the
company's policy
- assuming one exists
- for reporting fraudulent activity.In addition, honest persons generally are willing to report fraudulent activity
if they think they will be believed and there is a company policy for
communicating what they know. Dishonest persons are unlikely to report
fraudulent activity under any circumstances.
6. Do you know of anyone who might be stealing or taking unfair advantage
of the company?
Not only does this question provide interviewees with an opportunity to
expose fraudulent activity but it also increases the likelihood of detection
since the thief may think other employees with knowledge of the fraud will
blow the whistle. Both the thief and the honest person may be reluctant to
implicate those engaged in fraudulent activity. A dishonest person may be
more likely to quickly respond 'no' to this question, while an honest person
may hesitate before responding. Generally, and honest person with
knowledge of fraud can be persuaded to implicate others whereas a
dishonest person may refuse to respond.
7. Suppose someone who worked at the company decided to steal or commit
fraud. How could he or she do it and get away with it?
Although on the face of it the question appears limited to identifying
internal control deficiencies in the company, interviewees' responses may
provide clues to their honesty. An honest person may offer ideas readily.
However, someone engaged in fraud may hesitate to provide such
information and may give nonspecific answers.
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8. In your opinion, who is beyond suspicion when it comes to committing
fraud at this company?
In general, honest persons are not reluctant to eliminate possible suspects.
In contrast, those engaged in fraudulent activity tend not to narrow the list
of suspects. They want the circle of suspicion to be as wide as possible.
Sometimes they will even issue a denial. Such denials to nonaccusatory
questions may be indicative of a high-fTaud-risk employee.
9. Did you ever think about stealing from the company even though you
didn't go through with it?
Dishonest persons may quickly and emphatically say 'no.' Some honest
people probably have thought about committing fraud but didn't go through
with it.
10. Is there any other information you wish tofurnish regarding possible
fraud in this company?
This question allows the interviewee a final chance to provide information
about possible fraud within the company. A dishonest person may quickly
respond 'no,' whereas the honest person generally hesitates while
considering the question. With encouragement, they can be persuaded to
provide information. (Hansen, pp.45-46)
It is important to note that a clever, intelligent thief can give answers to
these questions that can throw the interrogator off his/her trail. A red flag
should go up if an employee gives responses that are too perfect. Given
the situation they are in, even the honest employee will seem nervous.
The forensic accountant will spend a lot of time searching and
following leads that will be dead-ends. However, it is essential to follow
and exhaust any leads or suspicions. No person in a company is beyond
suspicion until the forensic accountant has cleared them.
Deterring the Fraud
A fraud is probably the worst thing a company can face. It can
cost a large amount of money, both in the theft and in the costs of the
investigation. "Specialists calculate that the cost of fraud is frequently
twice the amount of the missing money. Often it is even more expensive.
About one in twenty company failures is attributable to fraud."
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(MacErlean, p.44) The other damaging effect fraud has, is the decrease in
public confidence. If the company appears to have difficulties controlling
their assets, then customers will not buy from them and lenders will not
provide loans to such a high risk. Therefore, it is essential for a company
to prevent the fraud from occurring.
The top two leading causes of fraud identified by KPMG are poor
internal controls and management override of internal controls. These are
two policies that could drastically decrease the risk of fraud for a very low
cost to the company. A company must remember that even their top
managers can be influenced to commit fraud. That is why the company
must incorporate proper controls at both the employee and managerial
level.
As mentioned in the "triangle of fraud," a person who commits a
fraud has rationalized the theft. This can be prevented by establishing a
code of conduct or by explaining what a fraud is to their employees. The
code of conduct will prevent the employee from convincing
himself/herself that they are not doing anything wrong. The code should
specifically describe legal and ethical expectations the company has for its
employees. By explaining what a fraud is, the company can prevent
employees from committing an act and then rationalizing that it was not
illegal. This also needs to be as specific as possible, but within reason.
The procurement of a company pen should not be considered theft, but
stealing large amounts of office supplies could. The broader the language
used to identify fraud, the easier it is for an employee to justify his/her
theft.
When implementing controls or prevention techniques, it is
important to realize that technology is not the only solution. Any person
with the right amount of motivation and intelligence can override any
technological system. The company must come up with a healthy
combination of technology and office procedures.
The best prevention of fraud is the threat that you could be caught.
"Fraud experts believe that one of the strongest deterrents to fraud is the
perception that effective detection controls are in place. Obviously,
people who think they will get caught rarely commit fraud." (Hansen, p.
44) A company also needs to give a perception that the thief will be
prosecuted. The threat of being caught is not a proper deterrent if the
employee thinks nothing will happen to him/her. The biggest problem
with the prevention of fraud, is that the penalties for committing it are not
severe. Even though some companies might not want to take a big legal
action against the thief, the threat of getting caught and severely punished
is enough to stop most people.
As identified by KPMG, the most common way fraud is detected is
through employees. Companies must make it possible for employees to
come forward and identify the fraud in an anonymous situation.
Employees who are afraid of being identified as whistle-blowers will only
come forward in this type of situation. The company also needs to make
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sure that the people receiving the reports are independent. This is a great
resource for identifying fraud, and must not be overlooked.
The list of possible prevention tactics could go on forever.
"Additional loss control measures employers should take include
establishing dual responsibility for the company's accounting and billing
functions. The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners also
recommends examining bank statements for unusual patterns, dual
endorsements and unfamiliar vendors, and checking the references of job
applicants carefully." (Pelland, p. 2) Companies must decide the extent of
resources they want to devote to fraud prevention. There is a point where
prevention costs will exceed the benefit, because no company can be
completely fraud-proof. However, it is far less costly in the long run to




In late 1997, Cendant Corporation was formed. It brought together
HFS Inc. run by Henry Silverman and CUC International run by Walter
Forbes. HFS is a franchising business that includes Days Inn, Avis rental
cars and Century 21 Real Estate. CUC is a membership club that offers
discounts for travel, dining and shopping.
Some people wondered how the merger was ever going to work.
The CEO's of the two companies could not be any different. Silverman is
a hard working, dedicated individual who was part of everything that
made HFS. He believed that the merger would work if the big issues were
correct, regardless of how the small issues were managed. Forbes, on the
other hand, went to great lengths to detach himself from running CUC.
He let all of his underlings handle all of the important decisions, while he
took on the role of "the visionary." Some of his ideas were so dreamy that
his staff began to call him the "Tooth Fairy."
Silverman should have been more cautious in his dealings with
CUC. It was discovered in early 1998, that "CUC had been padding its
results since at least 1995, creating more than $500 million of imaginary
profits to meet Wall Street's expectations." (Elkind, p. 1) It only took one
good quarter for the fraud to be discovered, and as a result the stock has
lost 75% of its value. "That the two men went through with the deal
anyway
- that they managed to convince themselves that they could
somehow make it work - shows how blinded they had become by Wall
Street's approbation." (Elkind, pol)
The Road to Fraud
When a fraud of this magnitude occurs, it is not because of one
factor. Cendant's gross misrepresentation is no exception to this rule.
The first mistake Cendant made was in the formation of its board
of directors. "If one set out to deliberately design a bad board, one could
hardly improve on Cendant's creation. The board was far too large to be
effective: 28 directors in all. But far more destructive was the commitment
to having 14 directors represent CUC and 14 others represent HFS
- and
being designated as such." (Lear, p. 2) A merger can only manage as well
as its employees work together. The divided loyalty of the board only
helped fuel the divided loyalty throughout Cendant Corporation.
This divided loyalty was the main reason why HFS was unable to
detect the fraud before and after the merger. "When the HFS side asked
CUC for access to key nonpublic information, permission was denied.
Though assured by Ernst & Young, CUC's outside accounting firm, that
the company was pristine, the HFS executives had no way to confirm it
themselves." (Elkind, p. 6) CUC hid behind the defense that if the merger
failed, then HFS could purchase a competitor of CUe. This allowed CUC
to hide the fraud from HFS, and ensure that the merger would take place.
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The main cause of the fraud was CUC's desperate attempt to meet
market expectations. Michael Monaco, Cendant's chief financial officer,
said that "cuc management looked at the numbers that were internally
generated, and compared them to the Street expectations. To the extent
there was a gap, they just fictitiously recorded revenues and increased
accounts receivable." As indicated in the beginning information, meeting
market expectations is one of the top reasons to commit fraud. CUC
business is dependant on public opinion, and they felt meeting
expectations was the only alternative they had.
As discussed earlier, this case has all three aspects of the "triangle
offraud." CUC needed to make the merger with HFS, and the only way
they could do this is if they had fantastic reported earnings. The
opportunity arose to the top executives, and they knew this was the course
of action they must take to save the merger. Finally, they rationalized the
act and made themselves believe that the ends justified the means.
Exposing the Fraud
CUC had managed to hold off detection for three years. However,
after the merger, it was more difficult to hide the adjustments from the
HFS side of the company. So in 1998, the top CUC executives decided to
bring HFS into their web of lies. A meeting was set-up between Scott
Forbes, Cendant's chief accounting officer, and CUC's president, Kirk
Shelton. As Scott Forbes recalls it:
When he got there, Shelton handed over a piece of
paper that surprised him: a schedule showing $165
million in revenue "adjustments" for Comp-U-Card,
CUe's largest division, in 1998. Shelton quickly
explained that the company had counted on moving
that amount from merger reserves into income. "We
want you to help us figure out how to creatively do
this," Shelton allegedly said. Now Forbes wasn't just
surprised, he was shocked: Merger reserves are
supposed to be used only for one- time merger-
related costs, such as severance packages-and they
are certainly not supposed to be used to boost
earnings. (Elkind, p.7)
CUe's executives must have thought that Forbes would agree to these
adjustments. Unexpectedly, he immediately notified Silverman of his
conversation with Shelton. The initial investigation uncovered the depth
of the fraud. It was determined that the scandal involved "17 of the
company's 22 business units and more than 20 CUC controllers. All told,
the company had recorded $511 million in bogus pretax income; which
inflated earnings by more than one-third over three years. In 1997 some
61 % of the company's net income had simply been made up." (Elkind, p.
8)
Accountants to the Rescue
Once the fraud was exposed, Cendant immediately replaced Ernst
& Young with Deloitte & Touche to continue external audit functions.
However, to deal with the fraud itself, they needed to turn to a service
dedicated to uncovering the causes of the problem. They hired Arthur
Andersen's forensic accounting specialists to investigate. Four months
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and $15 million dollars later, Andersen was able to uncover the
irregularities that lead to the overall fraud. These included:
1. Irregular charges against merger reserves. Operating results at the former
CUC business units were artificially boosted by recording fictitious
revenues through inappropriately reversing restructuring charge liabilities to
revenues. Many other irregularities were also generated by inappropriate
use of these reserves.
2. False coding of services sold to customers. Significant revenues from
members purchasing long-term benefits were intentionally misclassified in
accounting records as revenue from shorter-term products. The falsely
recorded revenues generated higher levels of immediately recognized
revenues and profits for CUe.
3. Delayed recognition of cancellation ofmemberships and "charge-backs"
(a charge-back is a rejection by a credit card-issuing bank of a charge to a
member's credit card account). In addition to overstating revenues, these
delayed charges caused CUe's cash and working capital accounts to be
overstated.
4. Quarterly recording of fictitious revenues. Large amounts of accounts
receivable entries made in the first three quarters of 1997 were fabricated,
had no associated clients or customers and no associated sale of services.
(Cendant, p. 2)
These irregularities prove how the fraud was conducted. However, these
were all tools to get to the grand goal of meeting market expectations.
The actions taken to restate earnings indicate that many people had to be
involved. These occurrences are not something one person could do over
several years without getting caught. As indicated before, "More than 20
present and former employees from various CUC business units in the
United States and Europe, including the major operating units of the
company, have said that they were instructed by persons at CUC corporate
headquarters to engage in the activities." (Audit Committee, p. 2)
Along with the irregularities, several accounting errors were
uncovered. Although these are separate from the irregularities, they still
required restatement. "These accounting errors included inappropriate
useful lives for certain intangible assets, delayed recognition of insurance
claims, and use of accounting policies that do not conform to generally
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accepted accounting principles." (Cendant, p. 2) It is important to note
that the accounting errors are not associated with the irregularities. These
are legitimate mistakes that only require restatement.
It has also been identified that the environment developed and
enhanced by the top executives has lead to the occurrence of the fraud.
The audit committee's "investigation has identified how a group of people
at CUC deliberately deceived and misled investors and business partners-
and reveals a corporate culture that encouraged this behavior." (Audit
Committee, p. 1) This environment of loose controls can be directly
correlated to the occurrence of this fraud.
Cendant Audit Committee Reports to Board of Directors stated
that Cosmo Corigliano, former chief financial officer of CU C, and Anne
Pember, former controller of CUC, were found to have directed
accounting irregularities to be entered (p. 2). The same committee found
that although no direct connections with the fraud could be made between
Walter Forbes and Kirk Shelton, they are still responsible for what
occurred. It is the responsibility of a senior manager to know the sources
of all profits to the company. Since the investigation, both Forbes and
Shelton have left Cendant.
In order to correct the irregularities, Cendant has restated all
financial statements affected. This is in addition to the errors that have
also been restated. Without proper restatements, shareholders will
continue to rely on false reports.
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Ernst & Young's Responsibility
As indicated previously, companies cannot rely on the external
auditors to discover all frauds. However, since HFS relied solely on the
findings of Ernst & Young to determine the merger, Cendant filed suit
against them. "In December of 1999, Ernst & Young agreed to pay $335
million to settle accusations involving its certification of financial
statements that fraudulently inflated the earnings of Cendant." (Treaster, p.
1) Even though they paid the settlement, Ernst & Young do not admit to
any wrongdoing. They take the defense that "Cendant has acknowledged
in the past that former CUC officials took pains to hide the fraud from
Ernst & Young." (Nelson, p. Bll)
However, Cendant has different views as to the fault of Ernst &
Young. "Cendant claims that Ernst & Young's reviews failed to meet
professional standards because Ernst & Young, among other things, didn't
ask CUC executives for documentation to support their financial
statements and never reviewed hundreds of improper entries." (Nelson, p.
B 11) It can be argued that since Cendant was heavily relying on Ernst &
Young's reports, that Ernst & Young sbouJd bave taken more care jn
investigating and reviewing CUC's statements. This is probably the main




Ernst & Young are not the only ones to blame. HFS had a
responsibility to detect, through interactions with CUC, that the merger
was risky. A red flag should have been raised when CUC denied every
request that HFS made to review their reports. Another red flag should
have been the extraordinary revenues CUC reported each quarter. These
two factors alone should have made Silverman stand back and reevaluate
the merger. Unfortunately, he was too blinded by the wonderful
expectations to see any of the warning signs.
Because of the above reasons, shareholders filed suit against
Cendant. In a landmark settlement, "Cendant agreed to pay its
shareholders $2.8 billion to settle charges of widespread accounting fraud
that wiped out billions in the company's market value." (Goodman, p. 1)
This is the largest settlement in the history of a case like this.
Ernst & Young had a responsibility to Cendant, and Cendant had a
responsibility to its shareholders. It is the duty of a corporation to
correctly present its financial statements so that investors have an accurate
background to make decisions. When a company breaks this duty, it is
expected that the shareholders should be compensated.
Conclusion
This case is the perfect example of what can happen when a
company is pressured to meet Wall Street expectations. The CEO's of
both companies overlooked common sense in favor of high returns. There
were a number of warning signs that Silverman should have identified, but
he was too driven to make the merger work. Forbes was too careless in
his running of the company, and therefore, created the environment to
allow the fraud.
Market expectations are a circular trap. In order for companies to
attract investors, they must make predictions of their future success that
are deemed desirable. This is all right when the company meets those
demands. However, it can be detrimental when the company does not.
Regardless of how a company performs during the year, it can be
devastated based solely on if it makes its expectations. Therefore, this was
a strong pressure that Cendant was unable to overcome.
In order to prevent future frauds of this kind, we must stop placing
such high value on market expectations. Part of investing is balancing the
risk with the return. A shareholder must take on some responsibility when
they are investing. Those involved with Cendant were damaged more by
the fraud then if Cendant had reported its earnings at below expectations.
Companies must realize that making fictional adjustments to meet
expectations is not the answer. Cendant is a wonderful example of this,
and its hardships must be remembered the next time a company is
pressured to meet expectations.
As has been identified, fraud is a very serious issue. Cendant was
lucky that they were able to overcome their difficulties, but many
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companies would not have had their success. The forensic accountant
plays an important role in the fight against fraud. It is their responsibility
to advise companies on how to prevent fraud from occurring, and also
investigate it when it does. They have many tools at their disposal, but it
takes a certain individual to be a truly good forensic accountant. Fraud is
a fluid crime that cannot be completely deterred, therefore, a company is
only as good as the internal controls it implements. It is the role of the
company to prevent fraud as much as possible, and the role of the forensic
accountant to investigate when it occurs.
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Appendix I:




Nineteen ninety-eight was a year of both turbulence
and accomplishment. Putting it into perspective, how-
ever, three major points stand out.
First, our employees performed admirably, under try-
ing circumstances. We have a highly talented team that
shares a culture dedicated to increasing shareholder value.
Second, we continued to refine and build upon our
excellent core businesses and achieved another year in
which ongoing operations reported strong revenues
and profits.
For the year, we achieved revenues from continuing
operations of $5.3 billion. up 25% from 1997. Adjusted
EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation
and amortization, adjusted to exclude items which are of
a non-recurring or unusual nature) and adjusted income
from continuing operations were $1.6 billionand
$705 million, respectively. Adjusted earnings per share
from continuing operations were $0.80, up 21 %.
And third, Cendant entered 1999 extremely
well-positioned in our businesses to benefit from the
growing needs of the Baby Boomers and other major
population segments in areas where they spend the
greatest amounts of money - in travel and residential
real estate-related services.
Real Estate Triumph
During the year, we realized a dramatic return on the
residential real estate strategy HFS launched in 1995.
Our efforts have culminated in our real estate Value
Circle, where our real estate business units mutually
support each other and identify ways to drive business
opportunities to each other. The business model within
Cendant's Real Estate Division includes CENTURY 21,
COLDWELL BANKER and ERA; the world's largest
relocation business, Cendant Mobility; and one of the
fastest growing mortgage originators in the US, Cendant
Mortgage. Since obtaining a mortgage is an inextricable
step in the process of buying a home, it's easy to see why
..
..
Cendant Chairman. President and CEO, Henry R. Silverman (seated).
with Vice Chairmen (Jeft to rJgh~ Robert D. Kunisch. Stephen P. Holmes.
James E. Buckman and Michael P. Monaco.
our Value Circle strategy is one of the strongest examples
of our cross-marketing philosophy.
In 1998, CENTURY 21, COLDWELL BANKER
and ERA brokerages, together with Cendant Mobility,
were able to drive substantial business to Cendant
Mortgage - helping to more than double adjusted
EBITDA to $188 million at our mortgage unit. And
we have an opportunity to significantly increase mort-
gage origination through our real estate brands in 1999
and the out years. The $5 billion in mortgages generat-
ed through Cendant affiliated real estate brands in 1998
represented only 4% penetration of mortgage origina-
tion through CENTURY 21, COLDWELL BANKER
and ERA. Adjusted EBITDA within the Real Estate
Division increased 68% to $661 million in 1998. Still,
we have only begun to reap the benefits of our real
estate Value Circle strategy.
We also completed several other positive initiatives.
We acquired Jackson Hewitt. extending our franchising
capability into tax preparation. We acquired National
TO SHAREHOLDERS
toright} Richard A. Smith, Chairman and CEO, Reai Estate Division;
d M. Johnson, Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Financial
cef; Samuel L. Katz, Executive Vice President, Strategic Development;
John W. Chidsey, Chairman and CEO, Insurance/Wholesale Division.
ar Parks, the largest non-municipally owned UK car
k operator, and Green Flag, a leading UK roadside
aging Through a Crisis
e year began with great enthusiasm, having just
mpleted the merger of HFS Incorporated and CUC
ternational. In April, however, we announced the
overy of accounting fraud that impacted previously
ued euc financial statements.
The market's reaction was swift and harsh. Our
ck price plunged, and fell further as we disclosed
efull extent of the problem. It was tremendously
'nful to our shareholders, as it was to all of us at
endant - management, employees and board mem-
rs alike - whose interests are closely aligned with
oseof our shareholders.
Asswiftly as the market reacted, however, so did we.
e were determined to do whatever was necessary to
restore Cendant's lost value - and its credibility.
We immediately began addressing the uncertainties we
faced, in order to put them behind us. We also began
communicating as fully as possible
- as soon as we had
verifiable information - to tell the truth, tell it all and
tell it promptly.
Before year-end, we had:
·
Completed a comprehensive forensic financial
investigation, working with a team of independent
auditors;
·
Restated three years of financial statements;
·
Overhauled and strengthened our management
team, and replaced the former cue management;
·
Resolved issues of corporate governance and manage-
ment succession so that we could move forward with
a decisive, independent board, which understood its
fiduciary duties and management's vision for restor-
ing the company's legacy of growth and profitability.
Having emerged from this crisis strong, not merely
intact, is a remarkable testament to the soundness of
our business model, the strength of our culture, the
business relationships we have developed and, especially,
to the extraordinary capabilities of our employees.
Refocusing Our Strategic Direction
In the wake of this crisis, we determined it was appro-
priate to change our strategic direction, from buying
companies and issuing our shares to facilitate these
acquisitions to being a buyer of Cendant stock and a
seller of non-core assets. In the fourth quarter of 1998
and the first quarter of 1999, we sold Hebda Mag
International and Cendant Software for approximately
$1.3 billion. These actions will be accretive to our earn-
ings. By the first quarter of 1999, proceeds from these
sales were used to repurchase more than $1.3 billion of
Cendant stock.
In addition, we terminated our plans to acquire
American Bankers Insurance Group and Providian
Insurance Companies, and, in February 1999, elected
not to proceed with the acquisition of RAC Motoring
when the Mergers and Monopolies Commission in the
UK imposed conditions that we found unacceptable.
We further strengthened our balance sheet by
restructuring our debt, reducing it to 35% of total
capitalization at year end and lengthened the maturity
of our obligations. Importantly, we maintained an
investment grade credit rating, reflecting our long
tradition of conservative financial management.
Looking Ahead
As we began 1999, we continued to concentrate on
growing our core businesses by providing highly focused
services to franchisees, licensees, affinity partners and
corporate clients.
Our ability to continue growing in 1999 and beyond
is based on our core competencies, which unify our
businesses and which we describe in this annual report:
building franchise systems, providing outsourcing
solutions, and delivering superior marketing.
Certainly, the future will be challenging. We must
continue to achieve strong unit growth and grow our
market share, even in a moderating economy. We must
manage our disposition program and work to satisfacto-
rily resolve class action litigation issues, the remaining
major uncertainty we face.
We will continue to invest in technology, including
hardware, software and the people to support these
systems, in order to be prepared for the year 2000 and
to remain at the forefront of all our businesses. We will
take advantage of the Internet's growing importance as
a utility to increase productivity and lower costs as well
as a means for conducting commerce.
Lastly, a personal note. I want to thank our employees
for their extraordinary efforts in 1998; our customers,
whose confidence enabled us to continue to serve them
with quality and dedication; and our management
team, whose leadership, belief and trust in our company
during our crisis was invaluable. Above all, I want to
thank our shareholders, who supported us and for
whom we perform each day to the best of our abilities.
Cendant has proven its strength. We remain dedicated
to increasing shareholder value and over time regaining
the investment community's full confidence in our
company. We know the best way to achieve this is
to continue to provide unsurpassed, innovative service
to our customers and to nurture the creativity and
winning attitude of our employees.
Sincerely,
Henry R. Silverman
Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
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Former broadcast journalist and founding member of
CNN's award-winning business team, Stuart varney
'{!dsome thought-provoking questions to Hemy R
verman during an interview that addressed the
'fltsof the past year as well as the Company's strategic
~and its commitment to restoring credibility and
holder value.
investors regaining confidence in the Company?
believe many investors have shifted their focus back to
e fundamentals of our Company. The investment
mmunity recognizes the fact that Cendant's growth
1998 was rather extraordinary, in spite of an extended
riod of enormous stress and distraction for manage-
ent and employees throughout the Company.
you beyond the distractions of the accounting
blems?
ostof this is now behind us. We have restated our
ancial results for all the relevant years. We are, once
in, an effective SECregistrant and back in the capital
kets; we've refinanced our balance sheet; we've ter-
inated transactions which became non-strategic; we
vereorganized our Board of Directors; and removed
Ithe former CUC senior management. Today, the
e senior managers that drove the former HFS
ancialperformance are now managing Cendant's
inesses. In summary, we have done everything that
told investors we would do to resolve uncertainties.
eluding the class action litigation, we have removed
e uncertainties created by the accounting fraud.
hen can you expect to resolve the uncertainty
neeming the shareholder litigation?
e have one last uncertainty, which is that we have
n sued by shareholders who owned Cendant when
e announced in April that our financial statements
uld not be relied upon. It is difficult to predict with
y certainty when the class action litigation will be
olved. However, in March, the Company reached a
al agreement with lead plaintiffs' counsel represent-
g the class holders of Cendant's PRIDES securities,
& STUART VARNEY
who held their securities on April 15, 1998, to settle
their class action brought against the Company.
Whos to blame for what happened?
Among others, certain managers at the former CUe.
Of course, it's inappropriate for me to say who I think
they are. I believe the people responsible for the criminal
acts committed at the former CUC International will
eventually be identified through active investigations
currently underway by various federal agencies. We also
believe that Ernst & Young, CUG's auditors for all the
relevant years, was grossly negligent in performing its
duties. As the world now knows, we relied heavily on
the financial statements audited and certified by Ernst
& Young. It never occurred to us that the financial state-
ments certified by Ernst & Young were anything but
accurate. And Cendant has brought a lawsuit against
Ernst & Young for this and other reasons.
Shouldn't the accounting fraud have been uncovered
through due diligence?
Our financial system is very vulnerable to fraud because
it's based on trust. We have a national honor system, so
to speak, and you expect individuals with whom you do
business to be honest. You have to begin with that pre-
sumption, especially in a merger of equals. We believed
the representations of CUG's senior managers - after
all, they were about to become our partners. Certainly,
we relied heavily on the financial statements of the for-
mer CUC, audited and certified by their accountants,
Ernst & Young. So, the thought of fraud never crossed
my mind. Counsel to the Audit Committee of
Cendant's Board of Directors reported that the kind of
widespread conspiracy engaged in by CUC manage-
ment is not the sort of thing detected by standard due
diligence and that CUC officers actively concealed
information from HFS. its lawyers and accountants.
Unless you conduct a forensic audit like Arthur
Andersen did, you would not have discovered this.
Such extensive audits are not realistic without clear
evidence of a problem. Simply put, you cannot conduct
a forensic audit of every prospective business partner or
Appendix ill:
Management's Discussion and Analysis of




We are one of the foremost consumer and business services
companies in the world. We were created through the
December 1997 merger (the "Cendant Merger") of HFS
Incorporated ("HFS") and CUC International Inc.
("CUC"). We provide business services to our customers,
many of which are consumer services companies, and also
provide fee-based services directly to consumers, generally
without owning the assets or sharing the risks associated with
the underlying businesses of our customers or collaborative
partners.
We operate in four principal divisions
-
travel related
services,real estate related services, alliance marketing related
servicesand other consumer and business services. Our busi-
nessesprovide a wide range of complementary consumer and
business services, which together represent nine business seg-
ments. The travel related services businesses facilitate vacation
timeshare exchanges, manage corporate and government vehi-
clefleets and franchise car rental and hotel businesses; the real
estaterelated services businesses franchise real estate brokerage
businesses,provide home buyers with mortgages and assist in
employee relocation; and the alliance marketing related servic-
esbusinesses provide an array of value driven products and
services.Our other consumer and business services include our
taxpreparation services franchise, information technology
services,car parking facility services, vehicle emergency sup-
port and rescue services, credit information services, financial
products and other consumer-related services.
As a franchisor of hotels, real estate brokerage offices, car
rental operations and tax preparation services, we license the
owners and operators of independent businesses to use our
brand names. We do not own or operate hotels, real estate
brokerage offices, car rental operations or tax preparation
offices(except for certain company-owned Jackson Hewitt
AND ANALYSIS OF
RESULTS OF OPERATIONS
offices which we intend to franchise). Instead, we provide our
franchisee customers with services designed to increase their
revenue and profitability.
We have recently changed our focus from making strategic
acquisitions of new businesses to maximizing the opportunities
and groWth potential of our existing businesses. In connection
with this change in focus, we intend to review and evaluate
our existing businesses to determine whether certain businesses
continue to meet our business objectives. fu patt of our ongo-
ing evaluation of such businesses, we intend from time to time
to explore and conduct discussions with regard to divestitures
and related corporate transactions. However, we can give no
assurance with respect to the magnitude, timing, likelihood or
business effect of any possible transaction. We also cannot pre-
dict whether any divestiture or other transactions will be con-
summated or, if consummated, will result in a financial or
other benefit to us. We intend to use a portion of the proceeds
from future dispositions, if any, together with the proceeds of
potential future debt issues and bank borrowings and cash
from operations, to retire indebtedness, to repurchase our
common stock commensurate with approvals from our Board
of Directors and for other general corporate purposes. fu a
result of our aforementioned change in focus, we completed
the sale of two of our business segments and divested a sepa-
rate subsidiary (see "Liquidity and Capital Resources _
Divestitures") .
Prior to the Cendant Merger, both HFS and CUC had
grown significantly through mergers and acquisitions
accounted for under both the pooling of interests method,
the most significant being the merger of HFS with PHH
Corporation ("PHH") in April 1997 (the "PHH Merger"),
and purchase method of accounting. The underlying ResulfS
of Operations discussions are presented as if all businesses
acquired in mergers and acquisitions accounted for as pool_
ings of interests, have operated as one entity since in .
(Dollan in millions)
Year Ended December 31. 1998 1997 0/0Change
Net revenues $5.283.8 $4.240.0 25%
Operating expenses!l) 3,693.9 2.990.3 24%







Merger-related costs and other
unusual chatges (credits) (67.2) 704.1
Financing costs 35.1
Depreciation and amortization
expense 322.7 237.7 36%
lntetest expense, net 113.9 50.\'> 125%
Pte-tax income from continuing
opetations befote minotity
interest, extraordinary gain
and cumulative effect of
accounting change 315.0 257.3 22%
Provision for income taxes 104.5 191.0 (45%)
Minority interest, net of tax 50.6
Income from continuing
operations before extraordinary
gain and cumulative effect of
accounting change 159.9 66.3 141%
Loss from discontinued
operations, net of tax (25.0) (26.8)
Gain on sale of discontinued
operations. net of tax 404.7
Extraordinary gain. net of tax 26.4
Cumulative effect of accounting
change, net of tax (283.1)
Net income (loss) $ 539.6 $ (217.2)
RESULTS OF OPERATIONS
This discussion should be read in conjunction with the
information contained in our Consolidated Financial
Statements and accompanying Notes thereto appearing else-
where in this Annual Report.
Our operating results and the operating results of certain
of our underlying business segments are comprised of busi-
ness combinations accounted for under the purchase method
of accounting. Accordingly, the results of operations of such
acquired companies have been included in our consolidated
operating results and our applicable business segments from
the respective dates of acquisition. See "Liquidity and
Capital Resources" for a discussion of our purchase method
acquisitions.
The underlying discussion of each segment's operating
results focuses on Adjusted EBITDA, which is defined as
earnings before interest, income taxes, depreciation and
amortization, adjusted for Other charges which are of a non-
recurring or unusual nature, and are not included in
assessing segment performance or are not segment-specific.
Our management believes such discussion is the most
informative representation of how management evaluates
performance. We have determined that we have nine
reportable operating segments based primarily on the types
of services we provide, the consumer base to which market-
ing efforts are directed and the methods we use to sell servic-
es. For additional information, including a description of the
services provided in each of our reportable operating seg-
ments, see Note 26 to the consolidated financial statements.
CONSOLIDATED RESULTS - 1998 vs. 1997
(I)
Exclusive of Other charges and depreciation and amortization expense.
*Not meaningful.
Revenues and Adjusted EBITDA
Revenues and Adjusted EBITDA increased $1.0 billion
(25%) and $340.2 million (27%), respectively, in 1998 over
1997, which reflected growth in substantially all of our
reportable operating segments. Significant contributing fac-
tors which gave rise to such increases included substantial
growth in the volume of mortgage services provided and an
increase in the amount of royalty fees received from our fran-
chised brands, principally within the real estate franchise seg-
ment. In addition, revenues and Adjusted EBITDA in 1998
included the operating results of 1998 acquisitions, including
National Parking Corporation ("NPC") and Jackson Hewitt
Inc. ("Jackson Hewitt"). A detailed discussion of revenues
Ner Balance at
Unusual Reducrions Deeember(In milliom) Charges 1997 1998 31, 1998
Fourth Quarter 1997 Charge $454.9 $(257.5) $(130.2) $67.2
Second Quarter 1997 Charge 283.1 (207.0) (59.7) 16.4
Total 738.0 (464.5) (189.9) 83.6
Reclassification for
discontinued operations (33.9) 33.9
Total Unusual Charges related
to continuing operations $704.1 $(430.6) $(189.9) $83.6
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and Adjusted EBITDA trends from 1997 to 1998 is includ-
. ed in the section entitled "Results of Reportable Operating
Segments - 1998 vs. 1997."
1998 Other Charges
Litigation Settlement. We recorded a non-cash charge of
$351.0 million in the fourth quarter of 1998 in connection
with an agreement to settle a class action lawsuit that was
brought on behalf of the holders of our Income or Growth
FELINE PRIDES securities who purchased their securities
on or prior to April 15, 1998, the date on which we
announced the discovery of accounting irregularities in the
former business units of CUC (see "Liquidity and Capital
.Resources
- FELINE PRIDES and Trust Preferred
Securities") .
Termination of Proposed Acquisitions. We incurred $433.5
million of costs, which included a $400.0 million cash pay-
ment to American Bankers Insurance Group, Inc. ("American
Bankers"), in connection with terminating the proposed
acquisitions of American Bankers and Providian Auto and





Executive Terminations. We incurred $52.5 million of
costsin 1998 related to the termination of certain of our for-
merexecutives, principally Walter A. Forbes, who resigned as
our Chairman and as a member of our Board of Directors in
July 1998. The severance agreement reached with Mr.
Forbesentitled him to the benefits required by his employ-
ment contract relating to a termination of Mr. Forbes'
employment with us for reasons other than for cause.
Aggregate benefits given to Mr. Forbes resulted in a charge
of$50.9 million comprised of $38.4 million in cash pay-
ments and 1.3 million of immediately vested Company stock
options, with a Black-Scholes value of $12.5 million.
Investigation-Related Costs. We incurred $33.4 million of
professional fees, public relations costs and other miscella-
neous expenses in connection with our discovery of account-
ingirregularities in the former business units of CUC and
the resulting investigations into such matters.
Financing Costs. In connection with our discovery and
announcement of accounting irregularities and the
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corresponding lack of audited financial statements, we were
temporarily disrupted in accessing public debt markets. As a
result, we paid $27.9 million in fees associated with waivers
and various financing arrangements. Additionally, during
1998, we exercised our option to redeem our 4%%
Convertible Senior Notes (the "4%% Notes"). At such time,
we anticipated that all holders of the 4WYo Notes would elect
to convert the 4%% Notes to our common stock. However,
at the time of redemption, holders of the 4%% Notes elected
not to convert the 4%% Notes to our common stock and as a
result, we redeemed such notes at a premium. Accordingly, we
recorded a $7.2 million loss on early extinguishment of debt.
1997 Merger-Related Costs and Other Unusual Charges
We incurred merger-related costs and other unusual charges
("Unusual Charges") in 1997 related to continuing opera-
tions of $704.1 million primarily associated with the
Cendant Merger (the "Fourth Quarter 1997 Charge") and
the PHH Merger (the "Second Quarter 1997 Charge").
Fourth Q!.tarter 1997 Charge. We incurred Unusual Charges
in the fourth quarter of 1997 totaling $454.9 million substan-
tially associated with the Cendant Merger and our merger in
October 1997 with Hebdo Mag International, Inc. ("Hebdo
Mag"), a classified advertising business. Reorganization plans
were formulated prior to and implemented as a result of
the mergers. We determined to streamline our corporate
organization functions and eliminate several office locations
in overlapping markets. Our management's plan included
the consolidation of European call centers in Cork, Ireland and
terminations of franchised hotel properties.
Unusual Charges included $93.0 million of professional
fees primarily consisting of investment banking, legal and
accounting fees incurred in connection with the aforemen-
tioned mergers. We also incurred $170.7 million of person-
nel-related costs including $73.3 million of retirement and
employee benefit plan costs, $23.7 million of restricted stock
compensation, $61.4 million of severance resulting from con-
solidations of European call centers and certain corporate
functions and $12.3 million of other personnel-related costs.
Unusual Charges included $78.3 million of business termina-
tion costs which consisted of a $48.3 million non-cash
impairment write-down of hotel franchise agreement assets
associated with a quality upgrade program and $30.0 million
of costs incurred to terminate a contract which may have
restricted us from maximizing opportunities afforded by the
Cendant Merger. We also provided for facility-related and
other costs of $112.9 million including $70.0 million of irrev-
ocable contributions made to independent technology trusts
for the direct benefit of lodging and real estate franchisees,
$16.4 million of building lease termination costs and a
$22.0 million reduction in intangible assets associated with
our wholesale annuity business for which impairment was
determined in 1997. During the year ended December 31,
1998, we recorded a net credit of$28.1 million to Unusual
Charges with a corresponding reduction to liabilities primarily
as a result of a change in the original estimate of costs to be
incurred. We made cash payments of $102.6 million and
$152.2 million during 1998 and 1997, respectively, related to
the Fourth Quarter 1997 Charge. Liabilities of $67.2 million
remained at December 31, 1998 which were primarily
attributable to fUture severance costs and executive termina-
tion benefits.
Second QJuzrter 1997 Charge. We incurred $295.4 million of
Unusual Charges in the second quarter of 1997 primarilyasso-
ciated with the PHH Merger. During the fourth quarter of
1997, as a result of changes in estimates, we adjusted certain
merger-related liabilities, which resulted in a $12.3 million
credit to Unusual Charges. Reorganization plans were formu-
lated in connection with the PHH Merger and were imple-
mented upon consummation. The PHH Merger afforded us,
at such time, an opportunity to rationalize our combined cor-
porate, real estate and travel-related businesses, and enabled our
corresponding support and service functions to gain organ-
izational efficiencies and maximize profits. We initiated a plan
just prior to the PHH Merger to close hotel reservation call
centers, combine travel agency operations and continue the
downsizing of fleet operations by reducing headcount and
eliminating unprofitable products. In addition, we initiated
plans to integrate our relocation, real estate franchise and
mortgage origination businesses to capture additional rev-
enues through the referral of one business unit's customers to
another. We also formalized a plan to centralize the manage-
ment and headquarters functions of our corporate relocation
business unit subsidiaries. Such initiatives resulted in write-
offs of abandoned systems and leasehold assets commencing
in the second quarter of 1997. The aforementioned reorgani-
zation plans included the elimination of PHH corporate
functions and facilities in Hunt Valley, Maryland.
Unusual Charges included $154.1 million of personnel-
related costs associated with employee reductions necessitated
by the planned and announced consolidation of our corpo-
rate relocation service businesses worldwide as well as the
consolidation of our corporate activities. Personnel-related
charges also included termination benefits such as severance,
medical and other benefits and provided for retirement bene-
fits pursuant to pre-existing contracts resulting from a change
in control. Unusual Charges also included professional fees of
$30.3 million, primarily comprised of investment banking,
accounting and legal fees incurred in connection with the
PHH Merger. We incurred business termination charges of
$55.6 million, which were comprised of $38.8 million of
costs to exit certain activities primarily within our fleet busi-
ness (including $35.7 million of asset write-offs associated
with discontinued activities), a $7.3 million termination fee
associated with a joint venture that competed with our
PHH Mortgage Services business (now known as Cendant
Mortgage Corporation) and $9.6 million of costs to termi-
nate a marketing agreement with a third party in order to
replace the function with internal resources. We also incurred
facility-related and other charges totaling $43.1 million
including costs associated with contract and lease termina-
tions, asset disposals and other expenses related to the consol-
idation and closure of excess office space. During the year
ended December 31, 1998, we recorded a net credit of $39.6
million to Unusual Charges with a corresponding reduction
to liabilities primarily as a result of a change in the original
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estimate of costs to be incurred. We made cash payments of
$27.8 million and $150.2 million during 1998 and 1997,
respectively, related to the Second Quarter 1997 Charge.
Liabilities of $16.4 million remained at December 31, 1998
which were attributable to future severance and lease termi-
natIon payments.
Depreciation and Amortization Expense
Depreciation and amortization expense increased $85.0
million (36%) in 1998 over 1997 as a result of incremental
amortization of goodwill and other intangible assets from
1998 acquisitions and increased capital spending primarily to
accommodate growth in our businesses.
Interest Expense and Minority Interest, Net
Interest expense, net, increased $63.3 million (125%) in
1998 over 1997 primarily as a result of incremental average
borrowings during 1998 and a nominal increase in the cost of
funds. We primarily used debt to fmance $2.9 billion of
acquisitions and investments during 1998, which resulted in
an increase in the average debt balance outstanding as com-
pared to 1997. The weighted average interest rate on long-
term debt increased from 6.0% in 1997 to 6.2% in 1998. In
addition to interest expense on long-term debt we also
incurred $50.6 million of minority interest, net of tax, prima-
rily related to the preferred dividends payable in cash on our
FELINE PRIDES and trust preferred securities issued in
March 1998 (see "Liquidity and Capital Resources
-
Financing Exclusive of Management and Mortgage Financing
-
FELINE PRIDES and Trust Preferred Securities").
Provision for Income Taxes
Our effective tax rate was reduced from 74.3% in 1997 to
33.2% in 1998 due to the non-deductibility of a significant
amount of Unusual Charges recorded during 1997 and the
favorable impact in 1998 of reduced rates in international
tax jurisdictions in which we commenced business opera-
tions during 1998. The 1997 effective income tax rate
included a tax benefit on 1997 Unusual Charges, which were
deductible at an effective rate of only 29.1 %. Excluding
Unusual Charges, the effective income tax rate on income




We recorded a $404.7 million gain, net of tax, on the sale of
discontinued operations in 1998, related to the dispositions of
our classified advertising and consumer software businesses.
Pursuant to a program to divest non-core businesses and
assets, in August 1998 (the "Measurement Date"), we




Operations"). Loss from discontinued operations, net of tax,
was $25.0 million in 1998 and $26.8 million in 1997. Loss
from discontinued operations in 1998 includes operating
results through the Measurement Date. The operating results
of discontinued operations in 1997 included $24.4 million of
Unusual Charges and $15.2 million of extraordinary losses,
net of tax. Unusual Charges, net of tax, in 1997 primarily
consisted of $19.4 million of severance associated with termi-
nated consumer software company executives and $5.0 million
of compensation related to a stock appreciation rights plan
which was paid in connection with our merger with Hebdo
Mag in October 1997. Such merger also resulted in a $15.2
million extraordinary loss, net of tax, associated with the early
extinguishment of debt.
Extraordinary Gain, Net
In 1997, we recorded a $26.4 million extraordinary gain, after
tax, on the sale ofInterval International, Inc. ("Interval") in
December 1997. The Federal Trade Commission requested that
we sell Interval in connection with the Cendant Merger as a
result of their anti-trust concerns within the timeshare industry.
Cumulative Effect of Accounting Change, Net
In 1997, we recorded a non-cash after-tax charge of $283.1
million to account for the cumulative effect of an accounting
change. In August 1998, the Securities and Exchange Comm-
ission ("SEC") requested that we change our accounting poli-
cies with respect to revenue and expense recognition for our
membership businesses, effective January 1, 1997. Although
we believed that our accounting for memberships had been
appropriate and consistent with industry practice, we com-
plied with the SEe's request and adopted new accounting
policies for our individual membership businesses.
RESULTS OF REPORTABLE OPERATING SEGMENTS - 1998 vs. 1997
(Dollars in mil/iom)
Revenues Adjusted EBITDA Adjusted EBITDA Margin
Year Ended December 31, 1998 1997 % Change 1998(1) 1997(2) % Change 1998 1997
Travel $1,063.3 $ 971.6 9% $ 542.5 $ 467.3 16% 51% 48%Individual
Membership 929.1 778.7 19% (57.8) 5.3 (6%) 1%Insurance/
Wholesale 544.0 482.7 13% 137.8 II 1.0 24% 25% 23%
Real Esrate
Franchise 455.8 334.6 36% 348.6 226.9 54% 76% 68%Relocation 444.0 401.6 11% 124.5 92.6 34% 28% 23%Fleet 387.4 324.1 20% 173.8 120.5 44% 45% 37%Mortgage 353.4 179.2 97% 187.6 74.8 151% 53% 42%Entertainment
Publications 197.2 188.1 5% 32.1 36.8 (13%) 16% 20%Other 909.6 579.4 57% 100.81') 114.5 (12%) 11% 20%
Total $5,283.8 $4,240.0 25% $1,589.9 $1.249.7 27% 30% 29%
I)) Excludes the following Other charges or credits: (i) $433.5 million fOrthe costs of terminating the proposed acquisitions of American Bankers and Providian; (ii) $351.0 million of
costS associated with an agreement to settle the PRIDES securities class action suit; (iii) $121.0 million comprised of the costs of the invesrigations into previously discovered account-
ing irregularities at the former cue business units, including incremental financing costs and separation payments, principally to our former chairman; and (iv) $67.2 million of net
credits associated with changes to the original estimate of costs to be incurred in connection with 1997 Unusual Charges.(2)
Excludes Unusual Charges of $704.1 million primarily associated with the Cendant Merger and the PHH Merger.(3)




Revenues and Adjusted EBITDA increased $91.7 million
(9%) and $75.2 million (16%), respectively, in 1998 over
1997. Contributing to the revenue and Adjusted EBITDA
increase was a $35.4 million (7%) increase in franchise fees,
consisting of increases of $23.5 million (6%) and $11.9 mil-
lion (8%) in lodging and car rental franchise fees, respectively.
Our franchise businesses experienced increases during 1998 in
worldwide available rooms (29,800 incremental rooms, domes-
tically), revenue per available room, car rental days and average
car rental rates per day. Timeshare subscription and exchange
revenue increased $27.1 million (9%) as a result of a 7%
increase in average membership volume and a 4% increase in
the number of exchanges. Also contributing to the revenue and
Adjusted EBITDA increase was $16.4 million of incremental
fees received from preferred alliance partners seeking access to
our franchisees and their customers, $12.7 million offees gen-
erated from the execution of international master license agree-
ments and a $17.7 million gain on our sale of one million
shares of Avis common stock in 1998. The aforementioned
drivers supporting increases in revenues and Adjusted EBITDA
were partially offset by a $37.8 million reduction in the equity
in earnings of our investment in the car rental operations of
Avis, Inc. ("ARAC") as a result of reductions in our ownership
percentage in such investment during 1997 and 1998 (see
"Liquidity and Capital Resources - 1996 Purchase Acquisitions
and Investments - Avis"). A $16.7 million (7%) increase in
marketing and reservation costs resulted in a $16.5 million
increase in total expenses while other operating expenses were rel-
atively flat due to leveraging our corporate infrastructure among
more businesses, which contributed to an improvement in the
Adjusted EBITDA margin from 48% in 1997 to 51% in 1998.
Individual Membership
Revenues increased $150.4 million (19%) in 1998 over 1997
while Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA margin
decreased $63.1 million and 7 percentage points, respectively,
for the same period. The revenue growth was primarily attrib-
utable to an incremental $27.9 million associated with an
increase in the average price of a membership, $25.8 million
of increased billings as a result of incremental marketing
arrangements, primarily with telephone and mortgage compa-
nies, and $35.9 million from the acquisition of a company in
April 1998 that, among other services, provides members
access to their personal credit information. Also contributing
to the revenue growth are increased product sales and service
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fees which are offered and provided to individual members.
The reduction in Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA
margin is a direct result of a $104.3 million (25%) increase in
membership solicitation costs. We increased our marketing
efforts during 1998 to solicit new members and as a result
increased our gross average annual membership base by
approximately 3.3 million members (11%) at December 31,
1998, compared to the prior year. The growth in members
during 1998 resulted in increased servicing costs during 1998
of approximately $33.2 million (13%). While the costs of
soliciting and acquiring new members were expensed in 1998,
the revenue associated with these new members will not begin
to be recognized until 1999, upon expiration of the member-
ship period.
Insurance/Wholesale
Revenues and Adjusted EBITDA increased $61.3 million
(13%) and $26.8 million (24%), respectively, in 1998 over
1997, primarily due to customer growth. This growth gener-
ally resulted from increases in affiliations with financial
institutions. Domestic operations, which comprised 77%
of segment revenues in 1998, generated higher Adjusted
EBITDA margins than the international businesses as a result
of continued expansion costs incurred internationally to
penetrate new markets.
Domestic revenues and Adjusted EBITDA increased $25.4
million (6%) and $23.6 million (22%), respectively. Revenue
growth, which resulted from an increase in customers, also
contributed to an improvement in the overall Adjusted EBIT-
DA margin from 23% in 1997 to 25% in 1998, as a result of
the absorption of such increased volume by the existing
domestic infrastructure. International revenues and Adjusted
EBITDA increased $35.9 million (41%) and $3.2 million
(54%), respectively, due primarily to a 42% increase in cus-
tomers while the Adjusted EBITDA margin remained rela-
tively flat at 7%.
Real Estate Franchise
Revenues and Adjusted EBITDA increased $121.2 million
(36%) and $121.7 million (54%), respectively, in 1998 over
1997. Royalty fees collectively increased for our CENTURY 21,
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COLDWELL BANKER and ERA franchise brands by
$102.0 million (35%) as a result of a 20% increase in home
sales by franchisees and a 13% increase in the average price of
homes sold. Home sales by franchisees benefited from exist-
ing home sales in the United States reaching a record 4.8
million units in 1998, according to data from the National
Association of Realtors, as well as from expansion of our fran-
chise systems. Because many costs associated with the real
estate franchise business, such as franchise support and infor-
mation technology, do not vary directly with home sales
volumes or royalty revenues, the increase in royalty revenues
contributed to an improvement in the Adjusted EBITDA
margin from 68% to 76%.
Relocation
Revenues and Adjusted EBITDA increased $42.4 million
(11%) and $31.9 million (34%), respectively, in 1998 over
1997. The Adjusted EBITDA margin improved from 23% to
28%. The primary source of revenue growth was a $29.3 mil-
lion increase in revenues from the relocation of government
employees. We also experienced growth in the number of
relocation-related services provided to client corporations and
in the number of household goods moves handled, partially
offset by lower home sale volumes. The divestiture of certain
niche-market property management operations accounted for
other revenue of $8.2 million. Expenses associated with
government relocations increased in conjunction with the vol-
ume and revenue growth, but economies of scale and a reduc-
tion in overhead and administrative expenses permitted the
reported improvement in Adjusted EBITDA margin.
Fleet
Revenues and Adjusted EBITDA increased $63.3 million
(20%) and $53.3 million (44%), respectively, in 1998 over
1997, contributing to an improvement in the Adjusted EBIT-
DA margin from 37% to 45%. We acquired The Harpur
Group Ltd. ("Harpur"), a leading fuel card and vehicle man-
agement company in the United Kingdom ("UK"), on
January 20, 1998. Harpur contributed incremental revenues
and Adjusted EBITDA in 1998 of $31.8 million and $20.8
million, respectively. The revenue increase is further attributable
to a 12% increase in fleet leasing fees and a 31 % increase in
service fee revenue. The fleet leasing revenue increase is due to
a 5% increase in pricing and a 7% increase in the number of
vehicles leased, while the service fee revenue increase is the
result of a 40% increase in number of fuel cards and vehicle
maintenance cards partially offset by a 7% decline in pricing.
The Adjusted EBITDA margin improvement reflects stream-
lining of costs at newly acquired Harpur and a leveraging of
our corporate infrastructure among more businesses.
Mortgage
Revenues and Adjusted EBITDA increased $174.2 million
(97%) and $112.8 million (151%), respectively, in 1998
over 1997, primarily due to strong mortgage origination
growth and average fee improvement. The Adjusted EBIT-
DA margin improved from 42% to 53%. Morrgage origina-
tion grew across all lines of business, including increased refi-
nancing activity and a shift to more profitable sales and pro-
cessing channels and was responsible for substantially all of
the segment's revenue growth. Mortgage closings increased
$14.3 billion (122%) to $26.0 billion and average origina-
tion fees increased 12 basis points, resulting in a $180.3 mil-
lion increase in origination revenues. Although the servicing
portfolio grew $9.6 billion (36%), net servicing revenue was
negatively impacted by average servicing fees declining 7
basis points due to the increased refinancing levels in the
1998 mortgage market, which shortened the servicing asset
life and increased amortization charges. Consequently, net
servicing revenues decreased $9.1 million, partially offset by
a $5.7 million increase in the sale of servicing rights.
Operating expenses increased in all areas, reflecting increased
hiring and expansion of capacity in order to support contin-
ued growth; however, revenue growth marginally exceeded
such infrastructure enhancements.
Entertainment Publications
Revenues increased $9.1 million (5%) and Adjusted EBITDA
decreased $4.7 million, in 1998 when compared to 1997.
Revenue growth was primarily driven by a $4.0 million (2%)
increase in coupon book sales, a $3.4 million (29%) increase
in related advertising revenues and a $3.4 million (11 %)
increase in gift wrap sales. The decline in Adjusted EBITDA
is directly attributable to an increased absorption of corporate
infrastructure costs in 1998 compared to 1997.
Other Services
Revenues increased $330.2 million (57%), while Adjusted
EBITDA decreased $13.7 million (12%). Revenues increased
primarily from acquired NPC and Jackson Hewitt operations,
which contributed $409.8 million and $53.7 million to 1998
revenues, respectively. The revenue increase attributable to
1998 acquisitions was partially offset by a $140.0 million
reduction in revenues associated with the operations of cer-
tain of our ancillary businesses which were sold during 1997,
including Interval, which contributed $121.0 million to 1997
revenues. We sold Interval in December 1997 coincident
to the proposed Cendant Merger, in consideration of
Federal Trade Commission anti-trust concerns within the
timeshare industry.
The revenue increase did not translate into increases in
Adjusted EBITDA primarily due to asset write-offs, disposi-
tions of certain ancillary business operations and approxi-
mately $8.0 million of incremental operating costs associated
with establishing a consolidated worldwide data center. We
wrote-off $37.0 million of impaired goodwill associated with
our National Library of Poetry subsidiary, and $13.0 million
of certain of our equity investments in interactive member-
ship businesses. Adjusted EBITDA in 1997 associated with
aforementioned disposed ancillary operations included $27.2
million from Interval and $18.0 million related to services
formerly provided to the casino industry. Our NPC and
Jackson Hewitt subsidiaries contributed $92.7 million and
$27.0 million to 1998 Adjusted EBITDA, respectively.









CONSOLIDATED RESULTS - 1997 vs. 1996
(Dollars in millions)
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$ (217.2) $ 330.0
(I)
Exclusive of merger-related costs, unusual charges and depreciation and amortization
expense.
'Not meaningful.
Revenues and Adjusted EBITDA
Revenues and Adjusted EBITDA increased $1.0 billion
(31%) and $447.0 million (56%), respectively, in 1997 over
1996, and were supported by growth in substantially all of
our reportable operating segments. Revenues and Adjusted
EBITDA in 1997 included a full year of operations from
companies acquired during 1996, including Coldwell Banker
Corporation ("Coldwell Banker") in May 1996, Avis, Inc.
("Avis") in October 1996 and Resort Condominiums
International, Inc. ("RCI") in November 1996 (see "Liquidity
md Capital Resources
- 1996 Purchase Acquisitions and
[nvestments"). A detailed discussion of fluctuations in rev-
:nues and Adjusted EBITDA from 1996 to 1997 is included
n the section entitled "Results of Reportable Operating
;egments
- 1997 vs. 1996."
~erger-Related Costs and Other Unusual Charges
r997. We incurred merger-related costs and other unusual
harges ("Unusual Charges ") in 1997 related to continuing
Iperations of $704.1 million primarily associated with the
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Cendant Merger and the PHH Merger. See "Results of
Operations
- Consolidated Results 1998 vs. 1997
-
Merger-Related Costs and Other Unusual Charges" for a
detailed discussion of such charges.
1996. We incurred Unusual Charges in 1996 related to con-
tinuing operations of $109.4 million substantially related to
our merger with Ideon Group, Inc. ("Ideon"). Unusual
Charges primarily included $80.4 million of litigation-related
liabilities associated with our determination to settle acquired
Ideon litigation which existed at the August 1996 merger
date. We have since settled all outstanding litigation matters
pursuant to which the primaty resulting obligation consisted
of a settlement made in June 1997 with the cofounder of
SafeCard Services, Inc. which was acquired by Ideon in 1995.
The settlement required us to make $70.5 million of pay-
ments in annual installments through 2003. We made cash
payments of $27.8 million and $56.3 million in 1998 and
1997, respectively, associated with 1996 Unusual Charges.
Depreciation and Amortization Expense
Depreciation and amortization expense increased $92.2 mil-
lion (63%) in 1997 over 1996, primarily as a result ofincre-
mental amortization of goodwill and other intangible assets
from 1996 acquisitions and increased capital spending.
Interest Expense, Net
Interest expense, net, increased $36.3 million in 1997 over
1996 primarily as a result of the February 1997 issuance of
$550 million 3% Convertible Subordinated Notes and interest
income earned in 1996 on approximately $420 million of
excess proceeds generated from the $1.2 billion public offering
of 46.6 million shares of our common stock in May 1996.
The increase in interest, net, was partially offset by a reduction
in the weighted average interest rate from 7.5% in 1996 to
6.0% in 1997 as a result of a greater proportion of ftxed rate
debt, carrying lower interest rates, to total debt.
Provision for Income Taxes
Our effective tax rate increased from 41.2% in 1996 to 74.3%
in 1997. The 1997 effective income tax rate included a 29.1%
effective tax rate on the tax benefit related to Unusual Charges
(Dollars in milliom)
Revenues Adjusted EBITDA Adjusted EBITDA Margin
YearEndedDecember31, 1997 1996 % Change 1997(1) 1996(2) % Change 1997 1996
Travel $ 971.6 $ 429.2 126% $ 467.3 $189.5 147% 48% 44%
1ndividual
Membership 778.7 745.9 4% 5.3 43.2 (88%) 1% 6%
1nsurance!
Wholesale 482.7 448.0 8% 111.0 99.0 12% 23% 22%
Real Estate
Franchise 334.6 236.3 42% 226.9 137.8 65% 68% 58%
Relocation 401.6 344.9 16% 92.6 65.5 41% 23% 19%
Fleet 324.1 293.5 10% 120.5 99.0 22% 37% 34%
Mortgage 179.2 127.7 40% 74.8 45.7 64% 42% 36%
Entertainment
Publications 188.1 174.6 8% 36.8 22.0 67% 20% 13%
Other 579.4 437.6 32% 114.5 101.0 13% 20% 23%
Total $4.240.0 $3,237.7 31% $1,249.7 $802.7 56% 29% 25%
0) Excludes Unusual Charges of $704.1 million primarily associated with the Condant Merger and the PHH Merger.(2)Excludes Unusual Charges of $109.4 million incurred in connection with the Ideon merger.
due to the significant non-deductibility of such costs. The
effective income tax rate on 1997 income from continuing
operations excluding Unusual Charges was 40.6%.
Discontinued Operations
We recorded a $26.8 million net loss from discontinued
operations in 1997 compared to net income of $16.7 million
in 1996. The operating results of discontinued operations
included $15.2 million of extraordinaty losses, net of tax, in
1997 and $24.4 million and $24.9 million of Unusual
Charges, net of tax, in 1997 and 1996, respectively. The
extraordinary losses and Unusual Charges incurred in 1997






Unusual Charges in 1996 consisted primarily of professional
fees incurred in connection with our mergers with certain
software businesses acquired in 1996. Excluding Unusual
Charges and extraordinary items, income from discontinued
operations decreased $28.8 million (69%) from $41.6 mil-
lion in 1996 to $12.8 million in 1997. Net income from the
classified advertising business remained relatively unchanged
from 1996 while net income from the consumer software
businesses decreased $28.5 million (72%) to $11.1 million
in 1997. In 1997 revenues increased $49.2 million (13%)
which were offset by increased operating expenses of $93.2
million (29%). The disproportionate increase in operating
expenses resulted from accelerating development and market-
ing costs incurred on titles without a corresponding revenue
increase because titles were not released to the marketplace as
planned in December 1997.
RESULTS OF REPORTABLE OPERATING SEGMENTS - 1997 vs. 1996
Travel
Revenues and Adjusted EBlTDA increased $542.4 million
(126%) and $277.8 million (147%), respectively, while the
Adjusted EBlTDA margin improved from 44% to 48%. The
acquisitions of Avis and RCI in October 1996 and November
1996, respectively, contributed incremental revenues and
Adjusted EBlTDA of $503.9 million and $248.2 million,
respectively. Excluding the 1996 acquisitions, revenues and
Adjusted EBITDA increased $38.5 million (9%) and $29.6
million (16%), respectively, primarily as a result of an increase
in lodging franchise fees which was driven by a 4% increase in
franchised rooms and a 2% increase in revenue per available
room. Expense increases were minimized due to the
significant operating leverage associated with mature franchise
operations and a leveraging of the corporate infrastructure
among more businesses.
Individual Membership
Revenues increased $32.8 million (4%) while Adjusted
EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA margin decreased $37.9
million (88%) and 5 percentage points, respectively. The
revenue increase in 1997 was primarily due to $25.4 million
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of increased product sales and service fees, which are offered
and provided to individual members. The increase in rev-
enues also included $7.1 million of incremental monthly
billings from new marketing arrangements made during 1996
with telephone and mortgage companies. The reduction in
Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA margin from 1996
to 1997 was principally due to increased membership solicita-
tion costs incurred during 1997, higher call center and servic-
ing expenses and start-up costs incurred to introduce new
membership clubs. The accounting policies for membership
revenue and expense recognition were changed effective
January 1, 1997. Therefore, results of operations for 1997
and 1996 were accounted for using different accounting poli-
cies. The pro forma effect of the accounting change, as if
such a change had been applied retroactively to 1996, would
have resulted in a reduction in 1996 revenues and Adjusted
EBITDA of $16.6 million and $11.3 million, respectively.
Insurance/Wholesale
Revenues and Adjusted EBITDA increased $34.7 million
(8%) and $12.0 million (12%), respectively, primarily due to
an overall growth in customer base during 1997. Domestic
operations, which comprised 82% and 84% of segment
revenues in 1997 and 1996, respectively, generated higher
Adjusted EBITDA margins than the international businesses
asa result of expansion costs incurred internationally to pene-
trate new markets. Domestic revenues and Adjusted EBITDA
increased $18.7 million (5%) and $10.2 million (11%),
respectively, in 1997 over 1996 while international revenues
md Adjusted EBITDA increased $16.0 million (22%) and
U.8 million (45%), respectively, for the comparable periods.
Real Estate Franchise
Revenues and Adjusted EBITDA increased $98.3 million
:42%) and $89.1 million (65%), respectively, in 1997 over
1996 while the Adjusted EBITDA margin improved from
;8% to 68%. The acquisitions of ERA and Coldwell Banker
ianchised brands in February 1996 and May 1996, respec-
:ively, contributed incremental revenues and Adjusted EBIT-
DA of $73.8 million and $74.6 million, respectively,
n 1997. Excluding the 1996 acquisitions, revenues and
I>,.djustedEBITDA increased $24.5 million (17%) and
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$14.5 million (17%) which was principally driven by
increased royalry fees generated from the Century 21 fran-
chised brand. Royalty fees from Century 21 franchisees
increased as a result of a 5% increase in home sales by fran-
chisees and an 11% increase in the average price of homes
sold. Existing home sales in the United States increased 3%
from 1996 to 1997 according to data from the National
Association of Realtors. Operating expenses, which did not
change proportionately with home sale volume, increased a
minimal $9.3 million (9%) to support the significant growth
of the business. In addition, the corporate infrastructure was
leveraged among more businesses.
Relocation
Revenues and Adjusted EBITDA increased $56.7 million
(16%) and $27.1 million (41%), respectively, primarily as a
result of the acquisition of Coldwell Banker in May 1996.
Coldwell Banker was a leading provider of corporate reloca-
tion services and contributed incremental revenues and
Adjusted EBITDA of $47.2 million and $18.6 million,
respectively. The Adjusted EBITDA margin improved from
19% to 23% as a result of economic efficiencies realized
from the consolidation of our relocation businesses.
Fleet
Revenues and Adjusted EBITDA increased $30.6 million
(10%) and $21.5 million (22%), respectively, in 1997 over
1996. The Adjusted EBITDA margin improved from 34%
to 37%. Revenue and Adjusted EBITDA growth in 1997
was primarily attributable to a 24% increase in service fee
revenues, supported by a 20% increase in number of cards
and an 8% increase in fleet leasing revenues, principally
resulting from a 5% increase in pricing. The Adjusted EBIT-
DA margin improvement reflected a leveraging of the corpo-
rate infrastructUre among more businesses.
Mortgage
Revenues and Adjusted EBITDA increased $51.5 million
(40%) and $29.1 million (64%), respectively, which was pri-
marily driven by mortgage origination growth and gain on
sale of servicing rights. The Adjusted EBITDA margin
improved from 36% to 42%. Mortgage originations increased
40% to $11.7 billion contributing $35.3 million additional
revenue while servicing revenue was relatively flat. The loan
servicing portfolio grew 18% to $26.7 billion while gain on
sale of servicing rights increased $12.6 million to $14.1 million.
Operating expenses increased to support volume groWth and to
prepare for continued expansion as the annual loan origination
run rate approached $18.0 billion. However, revenue growth
marginally exceeded increases in operating expenses.
Entertainment Publications
Revenues and Adjusted EBITDA increased $13.5 million
(8%) and $14.8 million (67%), respectively, in 1997 over
1996. The Adjusted EBITDA margin improved from 13% to
20%. Revenue growth was primarily driven by an increase in
coupon book sales. New sales channels were added in 1997,
which accounted for a majority of the revenue increase. The
Adjusted EBITDA margin improvement in 1997 reflected
economic benefits realized from the consolidation of two
independent sales forces.
Other Services
Revenues and Adjusted EBITDA increased $141.8 million
(32%) and $13.5 million (13%), respectively, in 1997 over
1996. Such increases were primarily supported by the
operating results of an information technology business
("WizCom") which was acquired in October 1996 as part of
the Avis acquisition. Our WizCom subsidiary operates the
telecommunications and computer system that facilitates
reservations and agreement processing for lodging and car
rental operations. The acquisition of WizCom accounted for
incremental revenues and Adjusted EBITDA in 1997 of
$90.3 million and $30.6 million, respectively.
Our other ancillary businesses collectively contributed to
the additional revenue growth, although Adjusted EBITDA
margins declined, primarily within certain business units
which were sold during 1997.
LIQUIDITY AND CAPITAL RESOURCES
Divestitures
Discontinued Operations. During 1998, we implemented a
program to divest non-core businesses and assets in order to
focus on our core businesses, repay debt and repurchase our
common stock (see "Overview"). Pursuant to such program,
on August 12, 1998, we announced that our Board of
Directors committed to discontinue our classified advertising
and consumer software businesses by disposing of Hebdo Mag
and Cendant Software Corporation ("CDS"), respectively. On
December 15, 1998, we completed the sale of Hebdo Mag to
its former 50% owners for $449.7 million. We received
$314.8 million in cash and 7.1 million shares of our common
stock valued at $134.9 million on the date of sale. We recog-
nized a $206.9 million gain on the sale of Hebdo Mag, which
included a tax benefit of $52.1 million.
On November 20, 1998, we announced the execution
of a definitive agreement to sell CDS for $800.0 million in
cash plus potential haure contingent payments pursuant
to the contract. The sale was completed on January 12, 1999.
We estimate that we will realize a gain of approximately
$380.0 million based upon the finalization of the closing bal-
ance sheet as of the sale date. We recognized $197.8 million
of such gain in 1998 substantially in the form of a tax benefit
and corresponding deferred tax asset.
Other. On January 12, 1999, we completed the sale of our
Essex Corporation ("Essex") subsidiary for $8.0 million. Essex
is a third-party marketer of financial products for banks, pri-
marily marketing annuities, mutual funds and insurance prod-
ucts through financial institutions.
Termination of Proposed Acquisitions
RAC Motoring Services. On February 4, 1999, we announced
our intention to not proceed with the acquisition of RAC
Motoring Services ("RACMS") due to certain conditions
imposed by the UK Secretary of State for Trade and Industty
that we determined to be not commercially feasible and,
therefore, unacceptable. We originally announced on May 21,
1998 a definitive agreement with the Board of Directors of
Royal Automobile Club Limited to acquire RACMS for
approximately $735.0 million in cash. We wrote-off $7.0 mil-
lion of deferred acquisition costs in the first quarter of 1999
in connection with the termination of the proposed acquisi-
tion of RACMS.
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American Bankers Insurance Group, Inc. On October 13,
1998, we and American Bankers entered into a settlement
agreement (the "ABI Settlement Agreement"), pursuant to
which we and American Bankers terminated a definitive agree-
ment dated March 23, 1998, which provided for our acquisi-
tion of American Bankers for $3.1 billion. Accordingly, our
pending tender offer for American Bankers shares was also ter-
minated. Pursuant to the ABI Settlement Agreement and in
connection with the termination of our proposed acquisition
of American Bankers, we made a $400.0 million cash payment
to American Bankers and wrote off $32.3 million of costs, pri-
marily professional fees. In addition, we terminated a bank
commitment to provide a $650.0 million, 364-day revolv-
ing credit facility, which was made available to partially fund
the acquisition.
Providian Auto and Home Insurance Company. On
October 5, 1998, we announced the termination of an agree-
ment to acquire Providian for $219.0 million in cash.
Certain representations and covenants in such agreement
had not been fulfilled and the conditions to closing had not
been met. We did not pursue an extension of the termination
date of the agreement because Providian no longer met our
acquisition criteria. In connection with the termination
of our proposed acquisition of Providian, we wrote off
$1.2 million of costs.
1998 Purchase Acquisitions
National Parking Corporation. On April 27, 1998, we
acquired NPC for $1.6 billion, substantially in cash, which
included the repayment of approximately $227.0 million of
outstanding NPC debt. NPC was substantially comprised of
two operating subsidiaries: National Car Parks and Green Flag.
National Car Parks is the largest private (non-municipal) car
park operator in the UK and Green Flag operates the third
largest roadside assistance group in the UK and offers a wide-
range of emergency support and rescue services. We funded
the NPC acquisition with borrowings under our revolving
credit facilities.
Harpur Group. On January 20, 1998, we completed the
acquisition of Harpur, a leading fuel card and vehicle man-
agement company in the UK, for $206.1 million in cash plus
contingent payments of up to $20.0 million over two years.
Jackson Hewitt. On January 7, 1998, we completed the
acquisition of Jackson Hewitt for approximately $476.3 mil-
lion in cash. Jackson Hewitt operates the second largest tax
preparation service franchise system in the United States. The
Jackson Hewitt franchise system specializes in computerized
preparation of federal and state individual income tax returns.
Other 1998 Acquisitions and Acquisition-Related Payments.
We acquired certain other entities for an aggregate purchase
price of approximately $463.9 million in cash during 1998.
Additionally, we made a $100.0 million cash payment to the
seller of RCI in satisfaction of a contingent purchase liability.
1997 Purchase Acquisitions and Investments
Investment in NRT. In 1997, we executed agreements with
NRT Incorporated ("NRT"), a corporation created to acquire
residential real estate brokerage firms. Under these agreements,
we acquired $182.0 million ofNRT preferred stock (and may
be required to acquire up to an additional $81.3 million of
NRT preferred stock). We received preferred dividend pay-
ments of $15.4 million and $5.2 million during the years
ended 1998 and 1997, respectively. On Februaty 9, 1999, we
executed new agreements with NRT, which among other
things, increased the term of each of the three franchise agree-
ments under which NRT operates from 40 years to 50 years.
In connection with the aforementioned agreements, at our
election, we will participate in NRT's acquisitions byacquir-
ing up to an aggregate $946.3 million (plus an additional
$500.0 million if certain conditions are met) of intangible
assets, and in some cases mortgage operations, of real estate
brokerage firms acquired by NRT. Through December 31,
1998, we acquired $445.7 million of such mortgage opera-
tions and intangible assets, (primarily franchise agreements)
associated with real estate brokerage companies acquired by
NRT, which brokerage companies will become subject to the
NRT 50-year franchise agreements. In Februaty 1999, NRT
entered into an agreement with us whereby we made an
upfront payment of $30.0 million to NRT for services to be
provided by NRT to us related to the identification of poten-
tial acquisition candidates, the negotiation of agreements and
other services in connection with future brokerage acquisitions
by NRT. Such fee is refundable in the event the services are
not provided.
Other. We acquired cerrain enriries in 1997 for an aggregare
purchase price of $289.5 million, comprised of $267.9 mil-
lion in cash and $21.6 million in our common srock
(0.9 million shares).
1996 Purchase Acquisitions and Investments
RCI In November 1996, we complered rhe acquisirion of all
rhe outsranding capital stock of RCI for $487.1 million
comprised of$412.1 million in cash and $75.0 million
(approximarely 2.4 million shares) in our common stock plus
contingent paymenrs of up to $200.0 million over a five year
period (we made a contingenr paymenr of $100.0 million
during the first quarter of 1998). RCI is the world's largest
provider of timeshare exchange.
Avis. In October 1996, we completed the acquisition of all of
the outstanding capital stock of Avis, including paymenrs
under certain employee stock plans of Avis and the redemp-
tion of a certain series of preferred stock of Avis for $806.5
million. The purchase price was comprised of approximately
$367.2 million in cash, $100.9 million in indebtedness and
$338.4 million (approximately 11.1 million shares) in our
common stock. Subsequently, we made contingenr cash pay-
menrs of $26.0 million in 1996 and $60.8 million in 1997.
The contingenr payments made in 1997 represented rhe incre-
menral amounr of value attributable to our common stock as
of the stock purchase agreemenr date in excess of the proceeds
realized upon subsequenr sale of our common stock.
Upon enrering into a definitive merger agreemenr to
acquire Avis, we announced our strategy to dilute our inrerest
in the Avis car rental operations while retaining assets associ-
ated with the franchise, including trademarks, reservation
system assets and franchise agreements with ARAC and other
licensees. In September 1997, ARAC (the company which
operated the rental car operations of Avis) completed an ini-
tial public offering ("IPO") which resulted in a 72.5% dilu-
tion of our equity inrerest in ARAC. Net proceeds from the
IPO of $359.3 million were retained by ARAC. In March
1998, we sold one million shares of Avis common stock and
recognized a pre-tax gain of approximately $17.7 million. At
December 31, 1998, our inrerest in ARAC was approximately
22.6%. In January 1999, our equity inrerest was further
diluted to 19.4% as a result of our sale of an additional
1.3 million shares of Avis common stock.
Coldwell Banker. In May 1996, we acquired by merger
Coldwell Banker, the largest gross revenue producing residen-
tial real estate company in Norrh America and a leading
provider of corporate relocation services. We paid $640.0 mil-
lion in cash for all of the outstanding capital stock of
Coldwell Banker and repaid $105.0 million of Coldwell
Banker indebtedness. The aggregate purchase price for the
transaction was financed through the May 1996 sale of an
aggregate 46.6 million shares of our common stock generating
$1.2 billion of proceeds pursuanr to a public offering.
Other. During 1996, we acquired certain other enrities for
an aggregate purchase price of $281. 5 million comprised of
$224.0 million in cash, $52.5 million of our common stock
(2.5 million shares) and $5.0 million of notes.
FINANCING (EXCLUSIVE OF MANAGEMENT AND
MORTGAGE PROGRAM FINANCING)
We believe that we have sufficienr liquidity and access to li-
quidity through various sources, including our ability to access
public equity and debt markets and financial institutions.
We currently have a $1.25 billion term loan facility in place
as well as committed back-up facilities totaling $1.75 billion,
of which $1.705 billion is currently undrawn and available.
Long-term debt increased $2.1 billion to $3.4 billion at
December 31, 1998 when compared to amounts outstanding
at December 31, 1997, primarily as a result of borrowings in
1998 to finance acquisitions and the repurchase of our com-
mon stock under a share repurchase program. Our long-term
debt, including current portion at December 31, 1998 substan-
tially consisted of $2.1 billion of publicly issued fixed rate debt
and $1.25 billion of borrowings under a term facility.
Term Loan Facilities
On May 29, 1998, we enrered inro a 364 day term loan
agreement wirh a syndicate of financial institutions which
provided for borrowings of $3.25 billion (the "Term Loan
Facility"). The Term Loan Facility, as amended, incurred
inrerest based on rhe London Inrerbank Offered Rate
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("LIBOR") plus a margin of approximately 87.5 basis points.
At December 31, 1998, borrowings under the Term Loan
Facility of $1.25 billion were classified as long-term based on
our proven intent and ability to refinance such borrowings on
a long-term basis.
On Februaty 9, 1999, we replaced the Term Loan Facility
with a new two year term loan facility (the "New Facility")
which provides for borrowings of $1.25 billion. The New
Facility bears interest at LIBOR plus a margin of approxi-
mately 100 basis points and is payable in five consecutive
quarterly installments beginning on the first anniversary of the
closing date. The New Facility contains certain restrictive
covenants, which are substantially similar to and consistent
with the covenants in effect for our existing revolving credit
agreements. We used $1.25 billion of the proceeds from the
New Facility to refinance the majority of the outstanding bor-
rowings under the Term Loan Facility.
Credit Facilities
Our primary credit facility, as amended, consists of (i) a
$750.0 million, five year revolving credit facility (the "Five
Year Revolving Credit Facility") and (ii) a $1.0 billion, 364
day revolving credit facility (the "364 Day Revolving Credit
Facility") (collectively the "Revolving Credit Facilities"). The
364 Day Revolving Credit Facility will mature on October 29,
1999 but may be renewed on an annual basis for an addition-
al 364 days upon receiving lender approval. The Five Year
Revolving Credit Facility will mature on October 1,2001.
Borrowings under the Revolving Credit Facilities, at our option,
bear interest based on competitive bids of lenders participat-
ing in the facilities, at prime rates or at LIBOR, plus a margin
of approximately 75 basis points. We are required to pay a per
annum facility fee of .175% and .15% of the average daily
unused commitments under the Five Year Revolving Credit
Facility and 364 Day Revolving Credit Facility, respectively.
The interest rates and facility fees are subject to change based
upon credit ratings on our senior unsecured long-term debt
by nationally recognized debt rating agencies. The Revolving
Credit Facilities contain certain restrictive covenants including
restrictions on indebtedness, mergers, liquidations and sale
and leaseback transactions and requires the maintenance of
certain financial ratios, including a 3: 1 minimum interest cov-
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erage ratio and a maximum debt-to-capitalization ratio of
0.5:1. At December 31, 1998 we had no outstanding bor-
rowings under the Revolving Credit Facilities.
7%% and 7%% Senior Notes
On November 17, 1998, we filed an amended shelf registra-
tion statement with the SEC for the aggregate issuance of up
to $3.0 billion of debt and equity securities. On November 24,
1998, we priced a tOtal of $1.55 billion of Senior Notes (the
"Notes") in a two-part issue. The first issue, $400.0 million
principal amount of7Yz% Senior Notes due December 1,
2000, was priced to yield 7.545%. The second issue,
$1.15 billion principal amount ofT%% Senior Notes due
December 1,2003, was priced to yield 7.792%. Interest
on the Notes will be payable on June 1 and December 1 of
each year, beginning on June 1, 1999. The Notes may be
redeemed, in whole or in part, at any time, at our option, at a
redemption price plus accrued interest to the date of redemp-
tion. The redemption price is equal to the greater of (i) the
face value of the Notes or (ii) the sum of the present values of
the remaining scheduled payments discounted at the treasury
rate plus a spread as defined in the indenture. The offering
was a component of a plan designed to refinance an aggregate
of $3.25 billion of borrowings under our former Term Loan
Facility, based on provisions contained in the indenture. Net
proceeds from the offering were used to repay $1.3 billion of
borrowings under the Term Loan Facility and for general
corporate purposes, which included the purchase of our com-
mon stock.
FELINE PRIDES and Trust Preferred Securities
On March 2, 1998, Cendant Capital I (the "Trust"), a statu-
tOry business Trust formed under the laws of the State of
Delaware and our wholly-owned consolidated subsidiary,
issued 29.9 million FELINE PRIDES and 2.3 million trust
preferred securities and received approximately $1.5 billion in
gross proceeds therefrom. The Trust invested the proceeds in
our 6.45% Senior Debentures due 2003 (the "Debentures"),
which represents the sole asset of the Trust. The obligations
of the Trust related to the FELINE PRIDES and trust pre-
ferred securities are unconditionally guaranteed by us to the
extent we make payments pursuant to the Debentures. The
issuance of the FELINE PRIDES and trust preferred securi-
ties, resulted in the utilization of approximately $3.0 billion of
availability under a $4.0 billion shelf registration statement.
Upon issuance, the FELINE PRIDES consisted of 27.6 mil-
lion Income PRIDES and 2.3 million Growth PRIDES
(Income PRIDES and Growth PRIDES hereinafter referred
to as "PRIDES"), each with a face amount of $50 per
PRIDE. The Income PRIDES consist of trust preferred secu-
rities and forward purchase contracts under which the holders
are required to purchase our common stock in Februaty 2001.
The Growth PRIDES consist of zero coupon U.S. Treasuty
securities and forward purchase contracts under which the
holders are required to purchase our common stock in
Februaty 2001. The stand-alone trust preferred securities and
the trust preferred securities forming a part of the Income
PRIDES, each with a face amount of $50, bear interest, in the
form of preferred stock dividends, at the annual rate of
6.45%, payable in cash. Payments under the forward purchase
contract forming a part of the Income PRIDES will be made
by us in the form of a contract adjustment payment at an
annual rate of 1.05%. Payments under the forward purchase
contract forming a part of the Growth PRIDES will be made
by us in the form of a contract adjustment payment at an
annual rate of 1.30%. The forward purchase contracts require
the holder to purchase a minimum of 1.0395 shares and a
maximum of 1.3514 shares of our common stock per
PRIDES security, depending upon the average of the closing
price per share of our common stock for a 20 consecUtive day
period ending in mid-February of 200 1. We have the right to
defer the contract adjustment payments and the payment of
interest on its Debentures to the Trust. Such election will
subject us to certain restrictions, including restrictions on
making dividend payments on our common stock until all
such payments in arrears are settled.
On March 17, 1999, we reached a final agreement to settle
a class action lawsuit that was brought on behalf of the hold-
ers of PRIDES securities who purchased their securities on or
prior to April 15, 1998. We originally announced a preliminary
agreement in principle to settle such lawsuit on January 7,
1999. The final agreement maintained the basic structure and
accounting treatment as the preliminary agreement. Under
the terms of the agreement, only holders who owned PRIDES
at the close of business on April 15, 1998 will be eligible to
receive a new additional "Right" for each PRIDES security
held. At any time during the life of the Rights (expires
February 2001), holders may (i) sell them or (ii) exercise
them by delivering to us three Rights together with two
PRIDES in exchange for rwo new PRIDES (the "New
PRIDES"). The terms of the New PRIDES will be the same
as the original PRIDES except that the conversion rate will be
revised so that, at the time the Rights are distributed, each
New PRIDES will have a value equal to $17.57 more than
each original PRIDES, or, in the aggregate, approximately
$351.0 million. The settlement resulted in a net increase to
shareholders' equity of$121.8 million. The final agreement
also requires us to offer to sell four million additional
PRIDES (having identical terms to currently outstanding
PRIDES), to holders of Rights for cash, at a value which will
be based on the valuation model that was Utilized to set the
conversion rate of the New PRIDES. Based on that valuation
model, the currently outstanding PRIDES have a theoretical
value of $28.07, based on the closing price of our common
stock of$16.6875 on March 17, 1999. The offering of addi-
tional PRIDES will be made only pursuant to a prospectus
filed with the SEe. We currently expect to use the proceeds
of such an offering to repurchase our common stock and for
other general corporate purposes. The arrangement to offer
additional PRIDES is designed to enhance the trading value
of the Rights by removing up to six million Rights from cir-
culation via exchanges associated with the offering and to
enhance the open market liquidity of New PRIDES by creat-
ing four million New PRIDES via exchanges associated with
the offering. If holders of Rights do not acquire all such
PRIDES, they will be offered to the public. Under the settle-
ment agreement, we also agreed to file a shelf registration
statement for an additional 15 million PRIDES, which could
be issued by us at any time for cash. However, during the last
30 days prior to the expiration of the Rights in February
2001, we will be required to make these additional PRIDES
available to holders of Rights at a price in cash equal to 105%
of the theoretical value of the additional PRIDES as of a spec-
ified date. The PRIDES, if issued, would have the same terms
as the currently outstanding PRIDES and could be used to
exercise Rights. Based on a market price of $16.6875, the
closing price per share of our common stock on
(In billions) 1998
1997
Commercial paper $2.5 $2.6






March 17, 1999, the effect of the issuance of the New
PRIDES will be to distribute approximately 19 million more
shares of our common stock when the mandatory purchase of
our common stock associated with the PRIDES occurs in
February 2001. This represents approximately 2% more
shares of our common stock than are currently outstanding.
The Rights will be distributed following final court
approval of the settlement and after the effectiveness of the
registration statement filed with the SEC covering the New
PRIDES. It is presently expected that if the court approves the
settlement and such conditions are fulfilled, the Rights will be
distributed in August or September 1999. This summary of
the settlement does not constitute an offer to sell any securi-
ties, which will only be made by means of a prospectus after a
registration statement is filed with the SEe. There can be no
assurance that the court will approve the agreement or that
the conditions contained in the agreement will be fulfilled.
Debt Retirements
On December 15, 1998, we repaid the $150.0 million
principal amount of our 5'i8% Senior Notes outstanding in
accordance with the provisions of the indenture agreement.
On May 4, 1998, we redeemed all of our outstanding
($144.5 million principal amount) 4WYo Convertible Senior
Notes due 2003 at a price of 103.393% of the principal
amount, together with interest accrued to the redemption
date. Prior to the redemption date, during 1998, $95.5 mil-
lion of such notes were exchanged for 3.4 million shares of
our common stock.
On April 8, 1998, we exercised our option to call our
6Yz% Convertible Subordinated Notes (the "6Yz% Notes")
for redemption on May 11, 1998, in accordance with the
provisions of the indenture relating to the 6Yz% Notes. Prior
to the redemption date, during 1998, all of the outstanding
6Yz% Notes were converted into 2.1 million shares of our
common stock.
FINANCING RELATED TO MANAGEMENT AND
MORTGAGE PROGRAMS
Our PHH subsidiary operates our mortgage, fleet and reloca-
tion servicesbusinesses as a separate public reporting entity
and supports purchases of leased vehicles, originated
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mortgages and advances under relocation contracts primarily
by issuing commercial paper and medium term notes and
maintaining securitized obligations. Such financing is not
classified based on contractual maturities, but rather is
included in liabilities under management and mortgage pro-
grams rather than long-term debt since such debt corre-
sponds directly with high quality related assets. PHH contin-
ues to pursue opportunities to reduce its borrowing require-
ments by securitizing increasing amounts of its high quality
assets. Additionally, we entered into a three year agreement
effective May 1998 and expanded in December 1998 under
which an unaffiliated Buyer (the "Buyer") committed to pur-
chase, at our option, mortgage loans originated by us on a
daily basis, up to the Buyer's asset limit of $2.4 billion.
V nder the terms of this sale agreement, we retain the servic-
ing rights on the mortgage loans sold to the Buyer and pro-
vide the Buyer with options to sell or securitize the mortgage
loans into the secondary market. At December 31, 1998, we
were servicing approximately $2.0 billion of mortgage loans
owned by the Buyer.
PHH debt is issued without recourse to the parent com-
pany. Our PHH subsidiary expects to continue to maximize
its access to global capital markets by maintaining the quality
of its assets under management. This is achieved by estab-
lishing credit standards to minimize credit risk and the
potential for losses. Depending upon asset groWth and finan-
cial market conditions, our PHH subsidiary utilizes the
Vnited States, European and Canadian commercial paper
markets, as well as other cost-effective short-term instru-
ments. In addition, our PHH subsidiary will continue to uti-
lize the public and private debt markets as sources of financ-
ing. Augmenting these sources, our PHH subsidiary will
continue to manage outstanding debt with the potential sale
or transfer of managed assets to third parties while retaining
fee-related servicing responsibility. PHH's aggregate borrow-
ings at December 31, 1998 and 1997 were as follows:
PHH filed a shelf registration statement with the SEC,
effective March 2, 1998, for the aggregate issuance of up to
$3.0 billion of medium-term note debt securities. These
securities may be offered from time to time, together or sepa-
rately, based on terms to be determined at the time of sale.
The proceeds will be used to finance assets PHH manages
for its clients and for general corporate purposes. As of
December 31, 1998, PHH had approximately $1.6 billion
of medium-term notes outstanding under this shelf registra-
tion statement.
Securitized Obligations
Our PHH subsidiary maintains four separate financing facili-
ties, the outstanding borrowings of which are securitized by
corresponding assets under management and mortgage pro-
grams. The collective weighted average interest rate on such
facilities was 5.8% at December 31, 1998. Such securitized
obligations are described below.
Mortgage Facility. In December 1998, our PHH subsidiary
entered into a 364 day financing agreement to sell mortgage
loans under an agreement to repurchase (the "Agreement")
such mortgages. The Agreement is collateralized by the
underlying mortgage loans held in safekeeping by the custodi-
an to the Agreement. The total commitment under this
Agreement is $500.0 million. Mortgage loans financed under
this Agreement at December 31, 1998 totaled $378.0 million.
Relocation Facilities. Our PHH subsidiary entered into a
364 day asset securitization agreement effective December
1998 under which an unaffiliated buyer has committed to pur-
chase an interest in the rights to payment related to certain
relocation receivables ofPHH. The revolving purchase com-
mitment provides for funding up to a limit of $325.0 million.
Under the terms of this agreement, our PHH subsidiary retains
the servicing rights related to the relocation receivables. At
December 31, 1998, our PHH subsidiary was servicing $248.0
million of assets which were funded under this agreement.
Our PHH subsidiary also maintains an asset securitization
agreement, with a separate unaffiliated buyer, which has a
purchase commitment up to a limit of $350.0 million. The
terms of this agreement are similar to the aforementioned
facility, with PHH retaining the servicing rights on the right
of payment. At December 31, 1998, our PHH subsidiary was
servicing $171.0 million of assets eligible for purchase under
this agreement.
Fleet Facilities. In December 1998, our PHH subsidiary
entered into two secured financing transactions each expiring
five years from the effective agreement date through its two
wholly-owned subsidiaries, TRAC Funding and TRAC
Funding II. Secured leased assets (specified beneficial interests
in a trust which owns the leased vehicles and the leases) total-
ing $600.0 million and $725.3 million, respectively, were
contributed to the subsidiaries by PHH. Loans to TRAC
Funding and TRAC Funding II, were funded by commercial
paper conduits in the amounts of $500.0 million and $604.0
million, respectively, and were secured by the specified bene-
ficial interests. Monthly loan repayments conform to the
amortization of the leased vehicles with the repayment of the
outstanding loan balance required at time of disposition of
the vehicles. Interest on the loans is based upon the conduit
commercial paper issuance cost and committed bank lines
priced on a LlBOR basis. Repayments ofloans are limited to
the cash flows generated from the leases represented by the
specified beneficial interests.
Other
To provide additional financial flexibility, PHH's current
policy is to ensure that minimum committed facilities aggre-
gate 100 percent of the average amount of outstanding
commercial paper. PHH maintains $2.65 billion of unse-
cured committed credit facilities, which are backed by domes-
tic and foreign banks. The facilities are comprised of $1.25
billion of syndicated lines of credit maturing in March 2000
and $1.25 billion of syndicated lines of credit maturing in the
year 2002. In addition, PHH has a $150.0 million revolving
credit facility, which matures in December 1999, and other
uncommitted lines of credit with various financial institu-
tions, which were unused at December 31, 1998.
Management closely evaluates not only the credit of the
banks but also the terms of the various agreements to ensure
ongoing availability. The full amount ofPHH's committed
facilities at December 31, 1998 was undrawn and available.





adequate protection should volatility in the financial markets
limit PHH's access to commercial paper or medium-term
notes funding. PHH continuously seeks additional sources of
liquidity to accommodate PHH asset growth and to provide
further protection from volatility in the financial markets.
In the event that the public debt market is unable to meet
PHH's funding needs, we believe that PHH has appropriate
alternative sources to provide adequate liquidity, including
current and potential future securitized obligations and its
$2.65 billion of revolving ctedit facilities.
PHH minimizes its expos ute to interest rate and liquidity
risk by effectively matching floating and fixed interest rate
and maturity characteristics of funding to related assets, vary-
ing short and long-term domestic and international funding
sources, and securing available credit under committed
banking facilities.
On July 10, 1998, PHH entered into a Supplemental
Indenture No.1 (the "Supplemental Indenture") with The
First National Bank of Chicago, as trustee, under the Senior
Indenture dated as ofJune 5, 1997, which formalizes PHH's
policy of limiting the payment of dividends and the outstand-
ing principal balance of loans to us to 40% of consolidated
net income (as defined in the Supplemental Indenture) for
each fiscal year. The Supplemental Indenture prohibits PHH
from paying dividends or making loans to us if upon giving
effect to such dividends and/or loan, PHH's debt to equity
ratio exceeds 8 to 1, at the time of the dividend or loan, as
the case may be.
LITIGATION
On April 15, 1998, we publicly announced that we discovered
accounting irregularities in the former business units of CUe.
Such discovery prompted investigations into such matters by
us and the Audit Committee of our Board of Directors. As a
result of the findings from the investigations, we restated our
previously reported financial results for 1997, 1996 and 1995.
Since such announcement, more than 70 lawsuits claiming to
be class actions, two lawsuits claiming to be brought deriva-
tively on our behalf and three individual lawsuits have been
filed in various courts against us and other defendants. With
the exception of an action pending in the Delaware Chancery
Court and an action filed in the Superior Court of New Jersey
that has been dismissed, these actions were all filed in or trans-
ferred to the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey, where they are pending before Judge William H.
Walls and Magistrate Judge Joel A. Pisano. The Court has
ordered consolidation of many of the actions.
The SEC and the United States Attorney for the District
of New Jersey are conducting investigations relating to the
matters referenced above. The SEC advised us that its inquiry
should not be construed as an indication by the SEC or its
staff that any violations of law have occurred. While we made
all adjustments considered necessary as a result of the findings
from the Investigations in restating our financial statements,
we can provide no assurances that additional adjustments will
not be necessary as a result of these government investigations.
On October 14, 1998, an action claiming to be a class
action was filed against us and four of our former officers and
directors. The complaint claims that we made false and mis-
leading public announcements and filings with the SEC in
connection with our proposed acquisition of American
Bankers allegedly in violation of Section 10(b) and 20(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and that
the plaintiff and the alleged class members purchased
American Bankers' securities in reliance on these public
announcements and filings at inflated prices.
As previously disclosed, we reached an agreement with
plaintiffs' counsel representing the class of holders of our
PRIDES securities who purchased their securities on or prior
to April 15, 1998 to settle their class action lawsuit against us
through the issuance of a new "Right" for each PRIDES
security held. See "Liquidity and Capital Resources
-
FELINE PRIDES and Trust Preferred Securities" for a more
detailed description of the settlement.
Other than the PRIDES class action litigation, we do not
believe that it is feasible to predict or determine the final out-
come of these proceedings or investigations or to estimate the
amounts or potential range of loss with respect to these pro-
ceedings or investigations. The possible outcomes or resolu-
tions of the proceedings could include a judgment against us
or settlements and could require substantial payments by us.
In addition, the timing of the final resolution of the proceed-
ings or investigations is uncertain. We believe that material
adverse outcomes with respect to such proceedings or
investigations could have a material impact on our financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows.
CREDIT RATINGS
In October 1998, Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Co. ("OCR"),
Standard & Poor's Corporation ("S&P"), and Moody's
Investors Service Inc. ("Moody's") reduced our long-term debt
credit rating to A- from A, BBB from A, and Baal from A3,
respectively. In October 1998, Moody's and S&P reduced
PHH's long-term and short-term debt ratings to A3/P2 and
A-/A2 from A2/P1 and A+/A1, respectively. PHH's long-term
and short-term credit ratings remain A+/F1 and A+/D1 with
Fitch IBCA and OCR, respectively. While the recent down-
grading caused us to incur an increase in cost of funds, we
believe our sources of liquidity continue to be adequate. (A
security rating is not a recommendation to buy, sell or hold
securities and is subject to revision or withdrawal at any time.)
REPRICING OF STOCK OPTIONS
On September 23, 1998, the Compensation Committee of
our Board of Directors approved a program to effectively
reprice certain company stock options granted to our middle
management during December 1997 and the first quarter of
1998. Such options were effectively repriced on October 14,
1998 at $9.8125 per share (the "New Price"), which was the
fair market value (as defined in the option plans) on the date
of such repricing. On September 23, 1998, the Compensation
Committee also modified the terms of certain options held by
certain of our executive officers and senior managers subject
to certain conditions including revocation of a portion of
existing options. Additionally, a management equity owner-
ship program was adopted that requires these executive officers
and senior managers to acquire our common stock at various
levels commensurate with their respective compensation levels.
The option modifications were accomplished by canceling
existing options and issuing a lesser amount of new options at
the New Price and, with respect to certain options of executive
officers and senior managers, at prices above the New Price.
SHARE REPURCHASE PROGRAM
We have completed the repurchase of our common stock pur-
suant to a $1.0 billion repurchase program, authorized by our
Board of Directors in October 1998. During the first quarter
of 1999, our Board of Directors authorized an additional
$400.0 million to be repurchased under such program. We
continue to execute this program through open-market pur-
chases or privately negotiated transactions, subject to bank
credit facility covenants and certain rating agency constraints.
As of March 11, 1999, we had repurchased a total of $1.3 bil-
lion of our common stock, reducing our outstanding shares by
64.2 million shares. As of December 31, 1998, we had repur-
chased a total of 13.4 million shares costing $257.7 million.
CASH FLOWS (1998 vs. 1997)
We generated $808.0 million of cash flows from operations in
1998 representing a $405.0 million decrease from 1997. The
decrease in cash flows from operations was primarily due to a
$391.7 million net increase in mortgage loans held for sale due
to increased mortgage loan origination volume.
We used $4.4 billion of cash flows for investing activities
in 1998, principally consisting of a $1.5 billion net invest-
ment in assets under management and mortgage programs
and $2.9 billion of acquisitions and acquisition related
payments, which included the acquisitions ofNPC and
Jackson Hewitt. In 1997, we used $2.3 billion for investing
activities including a $1. 5 billion net investment in assets
under management and mortgage programs and $568.2 mil-
lion of acquisitions and acquisition related payments. In
1998, cash flows from financing activities of approximately
$4.7 billion included $1.55 billion of proceeds from public
offerings of senior debt, $3.25 billion of term loan borrow-
ings and $1.4 billion of proceeds from the issuance of
FELINE PRIDES and Trust Preferred Securities. Gross cash
flows from financing activities were partially offset by $2.0
billion of term loan repayments, $257.7 million of our com-
mon stock purchases, and principal repayments of $150.0
million and $144.5 million pertaining to the outstanding
5Vs% Senior Notes and the 4'J4% Notes, respectively.
Additionally, in 1998 management and mortgage program
financing consisted of $1.1 billion of net borrowings which
funded our investments in assets under management and
mortgage programs. In 1997, cash flows from financing
activities of $900.1 million primarily consisted of net
borrowings totaling $435.9 million including net
proceeds of $543.2 million from the issuance of the 3%
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Convertible Subordinated Notes in February 1997 and
$509.9 million of net borrowings which funded purchases of
assets under management and mortgage programs.
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
In 1998, $355.2 million was invested in property and equip-
ment to support operational growth and enhance marketing
opportunities. In addition, technological improvements were
made to improve operating efficiencies. Capital spending in
1998 included the development of integrated business systems
within the Relocation segment as well as investments in sys-
tems and office expansion to support groWth in the Mortgage
segment. We expect to reduce our level of capital spending by
approximately 25% in 1999.
YEAR 2000 COMPLIANCE
The following disclosure is a Year 2000 readiness disclosure
statement pursuant to the Year 2000 Readiness and Disclosure
Act.
The Year 2000 presents the risk that information systems
will be unable to recognize and process date-sensitive informa-
tion properly from and after January 1, 2000. To minimize or
eliminate the effect of the Year 2000 risk on our business sys-
tems and applications, we are continually identifYing, evaluat-
ing, implementing and testing changes to our computer sys-
tems, applications and software necessary to achieve Year 2000
compliance. We implemented a Year 2000 initiative in March
1996 that has now been adopted by all of our business units.
As part of such initiative, we have selected a team of managers
to identifY, evaluate and implement a plan to bring all of our
critical business systems and applications into Year 2000 com-
pliance prior to December 31, 1999. The Year 2000 initiative
consists of four phases: (i) identification of all critical business
systems subject to Year 2000 risk (the "Identifi-cation Phase");
(ii) assessment of such business systems and applications to
determine the method of correcting any Year 2000 problems
(the "Assessment Phase"); (iii) implementing the corrective
measures (the "Implementation Phase"); and (iv) testing
and maintaining system compliance (the "Testing Phase"). We
have substantially completed the Identification and
Assessment Phases and have identified and assessed five areas
of risk: (i) internally developed business applications; (ii) third
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party vendor software, such as business applications, operat-
ing systems and special function software; (iii) computer
hardware components; (iv) electronic data transfer systems
between us and our customers; and (v) embedded systems,
such as phone switches, check writers and alarm systems.
Although no assurances can be made, we believe that we
have identified substantially all of our systems, applications
and related software that are subject to Year 2000
compliance risk and have either implemented or initiated the
implementation of a plan to correct such systems that are
not Year 2000 compliant. In addition, as part of our assess-
ment process we are developing contingency plans as neces-
sary. Substantially all of our mission critical systems have
been remediated during 1998. However, we cannot directly
control the timing of certain vendor products and in certain
situations, exceptions have been authorized. We are closely
monitoring those situations and intend to complete testing
efforts and any contingency implementation efforts prior to
December 31, 1999. Although we have begun the Testing
Phase, we do not anticipate completion of the Testing Phase
until sometime prior to December 1999.
We rely on third party service providers for services such
as telecommunications, internet service, utilities, components
for our embedded and other systems and other key services.
Interruption of those services due to Year 2000 issues could
have a material adverse impact on our operations. We have
initiated an evaluation of the status of such third party serv-
ice providers' efforts to determine alternative and contingency
requirements. While approaches to reducing risks of interrup-
tion of business operations vary by business unit, options
include identification of alternative service providers available
to provide such services if a service provider fails to become
Year 2000 compliant within an acceptable timeframe prior
to December 31, 1999.
The total cost of our Year 2000 compliance plan is antici-
pated to be $55.0 million. Approximately $30.0 million of
these costs had been incurred through December 31, 1998,
and we expect to incur the balance of such costs to complete
the compliance plan. We have been expensing and capitaliz-
ing the costs to complete the compliance plan in accordance
with appropriate accounting policies. Variations from antici-
pated expenditures and the effect on our future results of
operations are not anticipated to be material in any given
year. However, if Year 2000 modifications and conversions
are not made, including modifications by our third party
service providers, or are not completed in time, the Year
2000 problem could have a material impact on our opera-
tions, cash flows and financial condition. At this time we
believe the most likely "worst case" scenario involves poten-
tial disruptions in our operations as a result of the failure of
services provided by third parties.
The estimates and conclusions herein are forward-looking
statements and are based on our best estimates of future
events. Risks of completing the plan include the availability
of resources, the ability to discover and correct the potential
Year 2000 sensitive problems which could have a serious
impact on certain operations and the ability of our service
providers to bring their systems into Year 2000 compliance.
IMPACT OF NEW ACCOUNTING
PRONOUNCEMENTS
In June 1998, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
("FASB") issued Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards ("SFAS") No. 133 "Accounting for Derivative
Instruments and Hedging Activities." We will adopt SFAS
No. 133 effective January 1, 2000. SFAS No. 133 requires. us
to record all derivatives in the consolidated balance sheet as
either assets or liabilities measured at fair value. If the deriva-
tive does not qualify as a hedging instrument, the change in
the derivative fair values will be immediately recognized as
gain or loss in earnings. If the derivative does qualify as a
hedging instrument, the gain or loss on the change in the
derivative fair values will either be recognized (i) in earnings
as offsets to the changes in the fair value of the related item
being hedged or (ii) be deferred and recorded as a component
of other comprehensive income and reclassified to earnings in
the same period during which the hedged transactions occur.
We have not yet determined what impact the adoption of
SFAS No. 133 will have on our financial statements.
In October 1998, the FASB issued SFAS No. 134
"Accounting for Mortgage-Backed Securities Retained after
the Securitization of Mortgage Loans Held for Sale by a
Mortgage Banking Enterprise," effective for the first fiscal
quarter after December 15, 1998. We will adopt SFAS
No. 134 effective Januaty 1, 1999. SFAS No. 134 requires
that after the securitization of mortgage loans, an entity
engaged in mortgage banking activities classify the resulting
mortgage-backed securities or other interests based on its abil-
ity and intent to sell or hold those investments. On the date
SFAS No. 134 is initially applied, we will reclassify mortgage-
backed securities and other interests retained after the securi-
tization of mortgage loans from the trading to the available
for sale category. Subsequent accounting that results from
implementing SFAS No. 134 shall be accounted for in
accordance with SFAS No. 115 "Accounting for Certain
Investments in Debt and Equity Securities."
FORWARD LOOKING STATEMENTS
We make statements about our future results in this Annual
Report that may constitute "forward-looking" statements
within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995. These statements are based on our cur-
rent expectations and the current economic environment.
We caution you that these statements are not guarantees of
future performance. They involve a number of risks and
uncertainties that are difficult to predict. Our actual results
could differ materially from those expressed or implied in the
forward-looking statements. Important assumptions and
other important factors that could cause our actual results to
differ materially from those in the forward-looking state-
ments, include, bUt are not limited to:
·
The resolution or outcome of the pending litigation and
government investigations relating to the previously
announced accounting irregularities;
·
Uncertainty as to our future profitability and our ability to
integrate and operate successfully acquired businesses and
the risks associated with such businesses, including the
merger that created Cendant and the National Parking
Corporation acquisition;
Our ability to successfully divest non-core assets and
implement our new internet strategy;
·
Our ability to develop and implement operational and
financial systems to manage rapidly growing operations;
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· Competition in our existing and potential future lines of
business;
Our ability to obtain financing on acceptable terms to
finance our groWth strategy and for us to operate within
the limitations imposed by financing arrangements; and
Our ability and our vendors', franchisees' and customers'
ability to complete the necessary actions to achieve a Year
2000 conversion for computer systems and applications.
We derived the forward-looking statements in this Annual
Report from the foregoing factors and from other factors and
assumptions, and the failure of such assumptions to be real-
ized as well as other factors may also cause actual results to
differ materially from those projected. We assume no obliga-
tion to publicly correct or update these forward-looking state-
ments to reflect actual results, changes in assumptions or
changes in other factors affecting such forward-looking
statements or if we later become aware that they are not likely
to be achieved.
QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DISCLOSURES
ABOUT MARKET RISK
In recurring operations, we must deal with effects of changes
in interest rates and currency exchange rates. The following
discussion presents an overview of how such changes are
managed and a view of their potential effects.
We use various financial instruments, particularly interest
:ate and currency swaps and currency forwards, to manage
Jur respective interest rate and currency risks. We are exclu-
:ivelyan end user of these instruments, which are commonly
eferred to as derivatives. We do not engage in trading, mar-
~et-making or other speculative activities in the derivatives
narkets. Established practices require that derivative financial
nstruments relate to specific asset, liability or equity transac-
ions or to currency exposures. More detailed information
boUt these financial instruments, as well as the strategies and
olicies for their use, is provided in Notes 15 and 16 to the
nancial statements.
The SEC requires that registrants include information
)out potential effects of changes in interest rates and curren-
, exchange in their financial statements. Although the rules
fer alternatives for presenting this information, none of the
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alternatives is without limitations. The following discussion is
based on so-called "shock tests," which model effects of inter-
est rate and currency shifts on the reporting company. Shock
tests, while probably the most meaningful analysis permitted,
are constrained by several factors, including the necessity to
conduct the analysis based on a single point in time and by
their inability to include the extraordinarily complex market
reactions that normally would arise from the market shifts
modeled. While the following results of shock tests for interest
rate and currencies may have some limited use as benchmarks,
they should not be viewed as forecasts.
·
One means of assessing exposure to interest rate changes is
a duration-based analysis that measures the potential loss in
net earnings resulting from a hypothetical 10% change
(decrease) in interest rates across all maturities (sometimes
referred to as a "parallel shift in the yield curve"). Under
this model, it is estimated that, all else constant, such a
decrease would not adversely impact our 1999 net earnings
based on year-end 1998 positions.
·
One means of assessing exposure to changes in currency
exchange rates is to model effects on future earnings using
a sensitivity analysis. Year-end 1998 consolidated currency
exposures, including financial instruments designated and
effective as hedges, were analyzed to identifY our assets and
liabilities denominated in other than their relevant func-
tional currency. Net unhedged exposures in each currency
were then remeasured assuming a 10% change (decrease) in
currency exchange rates compared with the U.S. dollar.
Under this model, it is estimated that, all else constant, such
a decrease would not adversely impact our 1999 net earn-
ings based on year-end 1998 positions.
The categories of primary market risk exposure to us are:
(i) long-term U.S. interest rates due to mortgage loan origina-
tion commitments and an investment in mortgage loans
held for resale; (ii) short-term interest rates as they impact
vehicle and relocation receivables; and (iii) LIBOR and com-









CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
(In millions, except per share data)
Year Ended December 31,
REVENUES
Membership and service fees, net
Fleet leasing (net of depreciation and interest costs of










Termination of proposed acquisitions
Executive terminations
Investigation-related costs




Income from continuing operations before income taxes, minority interest,
extraordinary gain and cumulative effect of accounting change
Provision for income taxes
Minority interest, net of tax
Income from continuing operations before extraordinary gain
and cumulative effect of accounting change
Income (loss) from discontinued operations, net of tax
Gain on sale of discontinued operations, net of tax
Income before extraordinary gain and cumulative effect of accounting change
Extraordinary gain, net of tax
Income before cumulative effect of accounting change
Cumulative effect of accounting change, net of tax
Net income (loss)
INCOME (Loss) PER SHARE
Basic
Income from continuing operations before extraordinary
gain and cumulative effect of accounting change
Income (Joss) from discontinued operations
Gain on sale of discontinued operations
Extraordinary gain
Cumulative effect of accounting change
Net income (loss)
Diluted
Income from continuing operations before extraordinary
gain and cumulative effect of accounting change
Income (loss) from discontinued operations
Gain on sale of discontinued operations
Extraordinary gain
Cumulative effect of accounting change
Net income (loss)
























































































CON SOL I DATE DBA LAN' C E SHE ET S
(In millions)
December 31, 1998 1997
ASSETS
Current assets
Cash and cash equivalents
Receivables (net of allowance for doubtful accounts
of $123.3 and $61.5)
Deferred membership commission costs
Deferred income taxes
Other current assets
Net assets of discontinued operations
Total current assets





Total assets exclusive of assets under programs 12,704.6 7,629.7
-------------------
Assets under management and mortgage programs
Net investment in leases and leased vehicles
Relocation receivables




















LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY
Current liabilities















Total liabilities exclusive of liabilities under programs 6,611.0





Mandatorily redeemable preferred securities issued by subsidiary 1,412.1
Commitments and contingencies (Note 18)
Shareholders' equity
Preferred stock. $.01 par value - authorized 10 million shares;
none issued and outstanding
Common stock. $.01 par value - authorized 2 billion shares;
issued 860.551.783 and 838.333.800 shares
Additional paid-in capital
Retained earnings
Accumulated other comprehensive loss






Total shareholders' equity 4,835.6
Total liabilities and shareholders' equity






















CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY
(Inmillions)




Net unrealized gain on
marketable securities
Total comprehensive income
Issuance of common stock
Exercise of stock options by payment
of cash and common stock
Restricted stock issuance
Amortization of restricted stock
Tax benefit from exercise of
stock options
Cash dividends declared and other
equity distributions
Adjustment to reflect change in fiscal
years of pooled entities
Conversion of convertible notes
Purchase of common stock




Net unrealized loss on
marketable securities
Total comprehensive loss
Issuance of common stock
Exercise of stock options by payment
of cash and common stock
Restricted stock issuance
Amortization of restricted stock
Tax benefit from exercise of
stock options
Cash dividends declared
Adjustment to reflect change in
fiscal year from Cendant Merger
Conversion of convertible notes
Purchase of common stock
Retirement of treasury stock
Other
Balance at December 31, 1997

























































































Common Stock AdditIonal Other TotalPaid-in Retained Comprehensive Treasury Shareholders'(In millions) Shares Amount Capital Earnings Income (Loss) Stock Equity
Balance at January I, 1998 838.3 $8.4 $3,085.0 $ 940.6 $(38.2) $ (74.4) $3,921.4
Comprehensive income:
Net income 539.6
Currency translation adjustment (11. 2)
Total comprehensive income 528.4
Exercise of stock options by payment
of cash and common stock 16.4 .1 168.4 ( .2) 168.3Amortization of restricted stock
.7
.7Tax benefit from exercise of
stock options 147.3 147.3Conversion of convertible notes 5.9 .1 113.7 113.8
Purchase of common stock (257.7) (257.7)
Mandatorily redeemable preferred
securities issued by subsidiary (65.7) (65.7)
Common stock received as
consideration in sale of
discontinued operations (134.9) (134.9)
Rights issuable 350.0 350.0Other 64.0 64.0
-'--
--_.."--. --.._~--_....-
------- ---.--.,--..---Balance at December 31,1998 860.6 $8.6 $3,863.4 $1,480.2 $(49.4) $(467.2) $4,835.6
See accompanying notes to consolidated financial statements.
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS
(In mlJJion#




Adjustments to reconcile net income (loss) to net cash
provided by operating activities from continuing operations:
(Income) loss from discontinued operations, net of tax
Gain on sale of discontinued operations, net of tax
Non cash charges:
Litigation settlement
Extraordinary gain on sale of subsidiary, net of tax
Cumulative effect of accounting change, net of tax
Asset impairments and termination benefits
Merger-related costs and other unusual charges (credits)
Payments of merger-related costs and other unusual charge liabilities
Depreciation and amortization
Membership acquisition costs
Amortization of membership costs
Proceeds from sales of trading securities
Purchases of trading securities
Deferred income taxes
Net change in assets and liabilities from continuing operations:
Receivables
Deferred membership commission costs
Income taxes receivable





















Net cash provided by continuing operations exclusive of
management and mortgage programs
Management and mortgage programs:
Depreciation and amortization
Origination of mortgage loans







































Net cash provided by operating activities of continuing operations
INVESTING ACTIVITIES
808.0 1,213.0
Property and equipment additions
Proceeds from sales of marketable securities
Purchases of marketable securities
Investments
Net assets acquired (net of cash acquired) and
acquisition-related payments
















Net cash used in investing activities of continuing operations
exclusive of management and mortgage programs
See accompanying notes to consolidated financial statements.









Year Ended December 31. 1998
Management and mortgage programs:
Investment in leases and leased vehicles
Payments received on investment in leases and leased vehicles
Proceeds from sales and transfers of leases and leased vehicles
to third parties
Equity advances on homes under management
Repayment on advances on homes under management
Additions to mortgage servicing rights






















Net cash used in investing activities of continuing operations (4,351.8)
FINANCING ACTIVITIES
Proceeds from borrowings
Principal payments on borrowings
Issuance of convertible debt
Issuance of common stock
Purchases of common stock
Proceeds from mandatorily redeemable preferred securities








Net cash provided by financing activities of continuing operations
exclusive of management and mortgage programs
Management and mortgage programs:
Proceeds from debt issuance or borrowings
Principal payments on borrowings



























Net cash provided by financing activities of continuing operations
Effect of changes in exchange rates on cash and cash equivalents
Cash provided by (used in) discontinued operations
Net increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents







Cash and cash equivalents, end of period $ 1,008.7
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE OF CASH FLOW INFORMATION
Interest payments
Income tax payments. net

























December 31, 1998 1997 1997
Current assets $ 284.9 $ 209.1 $ 58.6Goodwill 105.7 42.2 181.5Other assets 88.2 49.2 33.2Totalliabilities (105.2) (127.0) (173.5)
Net assets of discontinued
operations $ 373.6 $ 173.5 $ 99.8
3.7
preliminary agreement in principle to settle such lawsuit on
January 7, 1999. The final agreement maintained the basic
structure and accounting treatment as the preliminary agree-
ment. Under the terms of the agreement only holders who
owned PRIDES at the close of business on April 15, 1998
will be eligible to receive a new additional "Right" for each
PRIDES securiry held. Right holders may (i) sell them or (ii)
exercise them by delivering to the Company, three Rights
together with two PRIDES in exchange for two new PRIDES
(the "New PRIDES"), for a period beginning upon distribu-
tion of the Rights and concluding upon expiration of the
Rights (February 2001).
The terms of the New PRIDES will be the same as the
original PRIDES except that the conversion rate will be
revised so that, at the time the Rights are distributed, each
New PRIDES will have a value equal to $17.57 more than
each original PRIDES, or, in the aggregate, approximately
$351.0 million. Accordingly, the Company recorded a non-
cash charge of $351.0 million in the fourth quarter of 1998
with an increase in additional paid-in capital and accrued lia-
bilities of $350.0 million and $1.0 million, respectively, based
on the prospective issuance of the Rights. The agreement also
requires the Company to offer to sell four million additional
PRIDES (having identical terms to currently outstanding
PRIDES) to holders of Rights for cash, at a value which will be
based on the valuation model that was utilized to set the con-
version rate of the New PRIDES. Based on that valuation
model, the currently outstanding PRIDES have a theoretical
value of $28.07 based on the closing price of the Company's
common stock of $16.6875 on March 17, 1999. The offering
of additional PRIDES will be made only pursuant to a
prospectUs filed with the SEe. The Company currently expects
to use the proceeds of such an offering to repurchase its com-
mon stock and for other general corporate purposes. The
arrangement to offer additional PRIDES is designed to
enhance the trading value of the Rights by removing up to six
million Rights from circulation via exchanges associated with
the offering and to enhance the open market liquidity of New
PRIDES by creating four million New PRIDES via exchanges
associated with the offering. If holders of Rights do not acquire
all such PRIDES, they will be offered to the public. Under the
settlement agreement, the Company also agreed to file a shelf
registration statement for an additional 15 million PRIDES,
which could be issued by the Company at any time for cash.
However, during the last 30 days prior to the expiration of the
Rights in February 2001, the Company will be required to
make these additional PRIDES available to holders of Rights at
NOTES To CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
Summarized financial data of discontinued operations are
as follows:
STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS DATA:
(In millions)
YearEnded December 31 ,
Net reven ues
Income (loss) before income raxes






Income (loss) before income taxes
and extraordinary loss 16.9
Provision for (benefit from)
income taxes 7.5
Extraordinary loss from early
extinguishment of debt, net
of a $4.9 million tax benefit




$ (18.5) $ 2.0
The Company allocated $19.9 million and $5.0 million of
interest expense to discontinued operations for the years
ended December 31, 1998 and 1997, respectively. Such
interest expense represents the cost of funds associated with
businesses acquired by the discontinued business segments at




NOTE 6. OTHER CHARGES
Litigation Settlement. On March 17, 1999, the Company
reached a final agreement to settle the class action lawsuit
that was brought on behalf of the holders of Income or
Growth FELINE PRIDES ("PRIDES") securities who pur-
chased their securities on or prior to April 15, 1998, the date
on which the Company announced the discovery of account-
ing irregularities in the former business units of CUC (see
Note 17 - Mandatorily Redeemable Trust Preferred
Securities Issued by Subsidiary). We originally announced a
1.7
.iTj70ce /0
=>0 equa/ CO f05<ro oFme meoretical value of the
additional PRIDES as of a specified date. The PRIDES, if
issued, would have the same terms as the currently outstanding
PRIDES and could be used to exercise Rights. Based on a mar-
ket price of $16.6875, the dosing price per share of the
Company's common stock on March 17, 1999, the effect of
the issuance of the New PRIDES will be to distribute approx-
imately 19 million more shares of Company common stock
when the mandatory purchase of Company common stock
associated with the PRIDES occurs in February 2001. This
represents approximately 2% more shares of Company com-
mon stock than are currently outstanding. The Righcs will be
distributed following final court approval of the settlement
and after the effectiveness of the registration statement filed
with the SEC covering the New PRIDES. It is presently
expected that if the court approves the settlement and such
conditions are fulfilled, the Rights will be distributed in
August or September 1999. This summary of the settlement
does not constitute an offer to sell any securities, which will
only be made by means of a prospectus after a registration
statement is filed with the SEe. There can be no assurance
that the court will approve the agreement or that the condi-
tions contained in the agreement will be fulfilled.
Termination of Proposed Acquisitions. On October 13,
1998, the Company and American Bankers Insurance Group,
Inc. ("American Bankers") entered into a settlement agree-
ment (the "Settlement Agreement"), pursuant to which the
Company and American Bankers terminated a definitive
agreement dated March 23, 1998 which provided for the
Company's acquisition of American Bankers for $3.1 billion.
Accordingly, the Company's pending tender offer for
American Bankers shares was also terminated. Pursuant to the
Settlement Agreement and in connection with termination of
the Company's proposed acquisition of American Bankers,
the Company made a $400.0 million cash payment to
American Bankers and wrote off $32.3 million of costs,
primarily professional fees.
On October 5, 1998, the Company announced the termi-
nation of an agreement to acquire, for $219.0 million in cash,
Providian Auto and Home Insurance Company ("Providian").
Certain representations and covenants in such agreement had
not been fulfilled and the conditions to dosing had not been
met. The Company did not pursue an extension of the termi-
nation date of the agreement because Providian no longer met
the Company's acquisition criteria. In connection with the
termination of the Company's proposed acquisition of
Providian, the Company wrote off $1.2 million of costs.
Executive Terminations. The Company incurred $52.5 mil-
lion of costs in 1998 related to the termination of certain
former executives of the Company, principally Walter A.
Forbes, who resigned as Chairman of the Company and as a
member of the Board of Directors. The severance agreement
reached with Mr. Forbes entitled him to the benefits required
by his employment contract relating to a termination of
Mr. Forbes' employment with the Company for reasons other
than for cause. Aggregate benefits given to Mr. Forbes result-
ed in a charge of $50.9 million comprised of $38.4 million in
cash payments and 1.3 million Company stock options, with
a Black-Scholes value of $12.5 million. Such options were
immediately vested and expire on July 28,2008.
Investigation-Related Costs. The Company incurred
$33.4 million of professional fees, public relations costs and
other miscellaneous expenses in connection with accounting
irregularities and resulting investigations into such matters.
Financing Costs. In connection with the Company's discov-
ery and announcement of accounting irregularities on April 15,
1998 and the corresponding lack of audited financial state-
ments, the Company was temporarily prohibited from access-
ing public debt markets. As a result, the Company paid $27.9
million in fees associated with waivers and various financing
arrangements. Additionally, during 1998, the Company exer-
cised its option to redeem its 4~% Convertible Senior Notes
(the "4~% Notes") (see Note 13
- Long-Term Debt-
4%«)/0Convertible Senior Notes). At such time, the Company
anticipated that all holders of the 4~% Notes would elect to
convert the 4~% Notes to Company common stock.
However, at the time of redemption, holders of the 4%«)/0
Notes elected not to convert the 4~% Notes to Company
common stock and as a result, the Company redeemed such
notes at a premium. Accordingly, the Company recorded a







To the Board of Directors and Shareholders of
Cendant Corporation
We have audited the consolidated balance sheets of Cendant
Corporation and subsidiaries (the "Company") as of
December 31, 1998 and 1997 and the related consolidated
statements of operations, shareholders' equity, and cash flows
for each of the three years in the period ended December 31,
1998. These consolidated financial statements are the
responsibility of the Company's management. Our responsi-
bility is to express an opinion on the consolidated financial
statements based on our audits. We did not audit the state-
ments of income, shareholders' equity, and cash flows of
PHH Corporation (a consolidated subsidiaty of Cendant
Corporation) for the year ended December 31, 1996 which
statements reflect net income of $87.7 million. Those state-
ments were audited by other auditors whose report has been
furnished to us, and our opinion, insofar as it relates to the
amounts included for PHH Corporation, is based solely on
the report of such other auditors.
We conducted our audits in accordance with generally
accepted auditing standards. Those standards require that we
plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance
about whether the financial statements are free of material
misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis,
evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the
financial statements. An audit also includes assessing the
accounting principles used and significant estimates made by
management, as well as evaluating the overall financial state-
ment presentation. We believe that our audits and the report
of the other auditors provide a reasonable basis for our opinion.
In our opinion, based on our audits and the report of the
other auditors, the consolidated financial statements referred
to above present fairly, in all material respects, the financial
position of Cendant Corporation and subsidiaries at
December 31, 1998 and' 1997 and the results of their opera-
tions and their cash flows for each of the three years in the
period ended December 31, 1998 in conformity with gener-
ally accepted accounting principles.
As discussed in Note 18 to the consolidated financial
statements, the Company is involved in certain litigation
related to the discovety of accounting irregularities in certain
former CUC International Ine. business units. Additionally,
as discussed in Note 2, effective Januaty 1, 1997 the
Company changed its method of recognizing revenue and
membership solicitation costs for its individual membership
business.
Parsippany, New Jersey
March 17, 1999
